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China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan
Series Overview 
This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian 
Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military 
officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically 
valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.1 
Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic, 
commercial, and strategic variation.2 Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese 
official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its 
transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility. 
The case studies illuminate the various functions of overseas strategic strongpoint ports in China’s 
Indian Ocean strategy. While the ports and associated infrastructure projects vary across key 
characteristics, all ports share certain distinctive qualities: (1) strategic location, positioned astride 
major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and/or near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) high-level 
coordination among Chinese party-state officials, state-owned enterprises, and private firms; (3) 
comprehensive commercial scope, including Chinese-led development of associated rail, road, and 
pipeline infrastructure and efforts to promote trade, financing, industry, resource extraction, and 
inland markets; and (4) potential or actual military utilization, with dual-use functions that can 
enable both economic and military activities.  
Ports are a key enabler for China’s economic, political, and potentially military expansion across the 
globe. As China’s overseas economic activity grows, so too have demands on the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) to secure PRC citizens, investments, and supply lines abroad. Official PLA missions 
now include “safeguarding the security of China’s overseas interests,”3 but “deficiencies in overseas 
operations and support” persist.4 Yet with the notable exception of the sole overseas PLA Navy 
(PLAN) base at Djibouti, all of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. 
Notably, the establishment of the Djibouti base followed many years of Chinese investment at the 
adjacent commercial port and sustained attention into resources and markets inland.5  
We should not assume that Djibouti is a model for other future bases. Instead, China’s strategic 
strongpoint model should be understood as an evolving alternative to the familiar model of formal 
overseas basing. With strongpoints, trade, investment, and diplomacy with the host country remain 
the principal functions. However, the strongpoint creates conditions of possibility for the PLAN to 
establish a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs. We are already observing this nascent 
network in operation across the Indian Ocean, and this series seeks to understand its key nodes.   
 
1 For an overview of this concept, see Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strongpoints and Chinese Naval Strategy.” Jamestown 
Foundation China Brief 19, no. 6 (March 22, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-and-chinese-
naval-strategy/.  
2 Future case studies include Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, and Dar es Salaam and 
Bagamoyo in Tanzania. None of these other commercial port projects hosts any PLA military facilities to date, though 
Chinese analysts discuss each as a potential strategic strongpoint. 
3 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (May 2015), 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm 
4 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era (July 2019), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. The section on “Protecting China’s Overseas Interests” 
states that China “builds far seas forces, develops overseas logistical facilities, and enhances capabilities in accomplishing 
diversified military tasks.” 
5 See Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, “Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,” 




Gwadar is an inchoate “strategic strongpoint” in Pakistan that may one day serve as a major platform 
for China’s economic, diplomatic, and military interactions across the northern Indian Ocean region. 
As of August 2020, it is not a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base, but rather an underdeveloped 
and underutilized commercial multipurpose port built and operated by Chinese companies in service 
of broader PRC foreign and domestic policy objectives. Foremost among PRC objectives for Gwadar 
are (1) to enable direct transport between China and the Indian Ocean, and (2) to anchor an effort to 
stabilize western China by shoring up insecurity on its periphery. To understand these objectives, this 
case study first analyzes the characteristics and functions of the port, then evaluates plans for 
hinterland transport infrastructure connecting it to markets and resources. We then examine the 
linkage between development in Pakistan and security in Xinjiang. Finally, we consider the military 
potential of the Gwadar site, evaluating why it has not been utilized by the PLA then examining a 
range of uses that the port complex may provide for Chinese naval operations. 
Key Findings 
• Chinese analysts view Gwadar as a top choice for establishing a new overseas strategic 
strongpoint, owing to its prime geographic location and strong Sino-Pakistani ties. Many PLA 
analysts consider Gwadar to be a suitable site for naval support. 
• China’s interest in Gwadar—and in Pakistan’s economic development in general—does not 
depend primarily on commercial returns. Instead, the Gwadar project is best understood as a 
mode of strategic investment in China’s internal and external security.  
• Externally, Gwadar’s principal strategic purpose for China is to become an “exit to the ocean” 
(出海口)—that is, a direct route via Chinese infrastructure to secure reliable access to the 
strategic space and resources of the northern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. 
• Internally, Gwadar is an extension of China’s national security and development policies. Beijing 
seeks to develop commercial linkages between western China, Pakistan, and Central Asia to 
promote economic growth and thus manage perceived risks to social stability in Xinjiang.  
• Extensive transport infrastructure is fundamental to China’s overall plans for Pakistan. Yet while 
the planned transport corridor is often discussed as though it were operational, very little modern 
infrastructure has been built beyond a few roads and the port itself. 
• The inland markets and resources of Pakistan (and Afghanistan) present some commercial 
prospects, but these have not yet borne fruit in part due to severe insecurity. 
• Security measures may mitigate some risks to Chinese projects and personnel, but Gwadar and its 
hinterlands are unlikely to be secure enough to become a major commercial entrepôt.  
• Gwadar is not a PLA base, but it is used extensively by the Pakistan Navy (PN). The PN operates 
frigates and patrol vessels bought from China and will also field Chinese-made submarines. Their 
facilities, parts, and technicians may be readily employed for some of the PLAN fleet. 
• Gwadar’s port facilities could support the PLAN’s largest vessels. Beyond the pier, Gwadar 
possesses a sizeable laydown yard for marshalling military equipment and materials. 
• Gwadar will not necessarily have utility as a base in a wartime scenario. The most critical factor 
informing this view is the apparent lack of political commitment between China and Pakistan to 
provide mutual military support during times of crisis or conflict. 
• If the infrastructure projects mature, Gwadar could become a key peacetime replenishment or 
transfer point for PLA equipment and personnel. Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other 




The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been the chief promoter, financier, developer, manager, 
and operator of the seaport at Gwadar since 2002.6 In October 2016, a decade after the port went into 
operation, the first trade expedition traveled from China to Gwadar on a 15-day, 3,115 kilometer 
(km) overland convoy from Xinjiang.7 The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, described this 
elaborate exercise to export a modest 100 containers by truck as the “first movement in the ‘One Belt 
One Road’ symphony, rich in romance.”8 There has not yet been a “second movement” of large-scale 
transport from China to Gwadar, calling into question the heavily promoted idea of an economic 
corridor from China to the Indian Ocean. 
Partly due to its anemic commercial performance, some observers conclude Gwadar port is on the 
verge of becoming “a new naval base in China’s string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean.9 
Meanwhile, Chinese and Pakistani promoters claim that the dusty, isolated fishing town of 90,000 
people is poised to become “a bustling city of two million people with a $30 billion GDP…and 1.2 
million high paid jobs.”10 Neither scenario is likely. While senior Pakistani officials have reportedly 
asked China to establish a Pakistani naval base at the site,11 China has taken a different tack. Chinese 
leaders instead envision Gwadar’s development into an international transport hub, the centerpiece of 
an ambitious bilateral economic and security program. 
Chinese firms would need to bring about a wholesale transformation of Gwadar for it to flourish in 
Pakistan’s remote and restive Balochistan province. Gwadar’s hinterlands are a sparsely populated, 
poor region bordering comparable areas of Iran and Afghanistan. It is forbidding terrain, prone to 
drought, flooding, and acute water and energy shortages, and plagued by labor unrest, terrorism, and 
long-standing anti-government militancy.12 The area is potentially resource-rich, but almost totally 
 
6 吴邦国副总理出席巴基斯坦瓜达尔港口项目一期工程开工典礼 [“Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo Attends the 
Groundbreaking Ceremony of the First Phase of Gwadar Port Project in Pakistan”], PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
March 25, 2002, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676308/xgxw_676314/t5512.shtml. 
7 郝洲, 周戎, 刘英 [Hao Zhou, Zhou Rong, and Liu Ying], 中巴经济走廊实地调研报告 [“China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor Field Research Report”], 人民大学重阳金融研究院与财经杂志报告 [Renmin University Chongyang Institute 
and Caijing Magazine Report], no. 19 (December 2016), p. 6. (“Renmin/Caijing Report”) 
8 中巴经济走廊树起“一带一路”样板 [“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Sets a Model for the Belt and Road”],” China 
Industry & Commerce News [中华工商时报], January 6, 2017,  
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/fwydyl/zgzx/201701/20170102496988.shtml. 
9 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific,” CSIS 
Briefs, April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-string-pearls-indo-
pacific. 
10 Gwadar New Smart Port City Masterplan 2020, http://investment.cpicglobal.com/gwadar2020-brochure-bau-us-
gs?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7Kb9ipiV6QIVhZ6fCh1QPwNDEAAYASAAEgJ8RvD_BwE. 
11 In 2011, visiting Beijing less than two weeks after the U.S. raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan’s 
Minister of Defense, Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, told foreign media that “we have asked our Chinese brothers to please 
build a naval base at Gwadar.” See Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial Times, May 22, 
2011, https://www.ft.com/content/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0. Chinese media covered these comments, 
declining to say whether or not Chinese leaders had agreed. See 外媒称巴基斯坦希望中国援建海军基地 [“Foreign 
Media Say Pakistan Hopes China Will Help Build a Naval Base”],”新华网 [Xinhua Net], May 23, 2011, 
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20110523/105539.shtml. 
12 Frederic Grare, “Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (April 11, 
2013), https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-state-versus-nation-pub-51488. A United Nations 
Development Program report from 2017 noted that the situation is, if anything, deteriorating. “In Balochistan, 20 out of 24 
districts, for which decade-old data is available, suffered a fall in their rankings [in the Human Development Index, a 
composite indicator of standards of living].” Adil Najam and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan Human Development Index Report 
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lacking in industry and modern infrastructure to deliver its possible mineral wealth to market.13 
Chinese analysts nonetheless continue to assert that “Gwadar is becoming ‘Shenzhen’ in Pakistan,” 
hoping against all odds that Balochistan will reprise the economic miracles of China’s Pearl River 
Delta.14 
Thus far, commercial activity at Gwadar has been quite limited. The port has seen very little vessel 
traffic in over a decade of operation, and its overland transport links remain tenuous. Nonetheless, 
Chinese leadership continues to plow financial and political capital into this ambitious, long-term 
enterprise. If it is unlikely to become a major economic hub, why is the Gwadar project still under 
development? What are the motivations for continued Chinese interest and investment in the port and 
surrounding infrastructure? How do Chinese leaders and experts understand the purpose of this 
venture?  
This case study focuses on China’s domestic discussion about Gwadar to understand why it remains 
a desirable overseas strategic strongpoint for the PRC. There are two principal reasons, which 
converge uniquely on Gwadar. The first is the port’s prized geostrategic location; the second is its 
critical function in a broader Chinese program to develop Pakistan in order to better address China’s 
domestic and regional security concerns. The evidence for these motivations emerges in the course of 
the proceeding analysis, but both warrant brief exposition before analyzing the port complex itself.  
 
2017,” United Nations Development Program Human Development Report, 2017, 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/HDR/HDI%20Report_2017.pdf. It is also the site of major shortfalls in 
human resources, including poor health and education. See The World Bank, “Balochistan, Pakistan: Strengthening 
Budget Management to Improve Education Service Delivery,” May 2018, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/872171540557541709/pdf/Balochistan-Strengthening-Budget-Management-
to-Improve-Education-Service-Delivery.pdf. 
13 Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, “Draft Balochistan Comprehensive Development 
Strategy (2013-2020),” United Nations Development Program Roadmap, 2013, 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/PROCUREMENT/2018/July%202018/2)%20BCDS%20Revised%20Fi
nal%20Draft%20August%2027%202013.pdf; Asian Development Bank, “Technical Assistance Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report,” ADB Technical Assistance, Project Number 39003, (December 2005), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/68721/39003-pak-tar.pdf; Azhar Ahmad, 瓜达尔—地区战略转
型中的平衡点 [Gwadar: Balance Point For a Region in Strategic Transition], trans. 李景峰, 史高杰 [Li Lingfeng and 
Shi Gaojie], (Kunming: Yunnan University Press, 2017), p. 180. 
14 季伟 [Li Wei], 瓜达尔正在成为巴基斯坦的“深圳” [“Gwadar Is Becoming Pakistan’s ‘Shenzhen’”], 新华网 [Xinhua 
Net], August 28, 2018, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2018-08/28/c_1123340282.htm; 黄安芸, 杨超, 成奕霖 [Huang Anyun, 
Yang Chao, and Cheng Yilin], [“Gwadar: From a ‘Small Fishing Village’ to the ‘Pearl’ of the China Pakistan Economic 




Figure 1. A view of the Indian Ocean from China.15 
Objective #1: An Exit to the Sea 
China’s interest in Gwadar is dictated first by its strategic geography. Sited on Pakistan’s 
southwestern Makran coastline, the port lies just 400 km east of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow 
waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to global markets, and through which over 40 percent of 
China’s imported oil transits.16 Iran is only 80 km to the west, and Gwadar’s home province of 
Balochistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, some 500 km to the north of the port. Traveling 
overland from Gwadar, China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang lies 1,800 km northeast over the 
Karakorum mountain range. Pakistan also shares a 520 km border with Xinjiang, part of which is 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir disputed with India. 
 
15 Map commissioned by CMSI, created by Andrew Rhodes. Blue lines show major shipping lanes, and red lines show 
proposed economic corridors linking western China directly to the Indian Ocean. The reddish shaded areas along the Sino-
Indian borders designate disputed territory. 
16 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, oil exports passing through the Strait of Hormuz average 21 
million barrels/day, accounting for one third of globally traded oil. See “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most 
Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 20, 2019, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932. The Chinese oil import figure (40.9 percent) comes from 
researchers at Dalian Maritime University under grants from the PRC State Council (Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Ministry of Education), Liaoning Province, and the Chinese Communist Party (Central Party Grant for Basic Research). 
王爽 [Wang Shuang] et al., 瓜达尔港通航后的中国进口原油海运路径选择研究 [“Research on the Selection of Routes 
for Maritime Transportation of Imported Crude Oil from Gwadar Port to China”],” 中国软科学 [China Soft Sciences], no. 
5 (2018), p. 21. 
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Because of this geography, Chinese strategists prize Gwadar as a strategic strongpoint in a vital 
geopolitical region. It holds particular salience among China’s strongpoints for its role as an “exit to 
the sea” (出海口) that links the Chinese mainland directly to the Indian Ocean.17 In this respect, 
Gwadar differs significantly from the strategic strongpoint at Djibouti, the subject of the first case 
study in this series. The Chinese presence at Djibouti expands the nation’s reach with a foothold on 
the African continent, creating a military base from which to begin establishing exterior lines of 
naval operations from the Chinese mainland across the Indian Ocean.18  
Pakistan, by contrast, is on China’s immediate periphery and provides a rare channel of access to the 
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Pakistan and Myanmar are the only states other than India that are 
contiguous to both Chinese territory and the Indian Ocean, and therefore have significant bearing 
both on China’s peripheral security and its maritime access (see Figure 1).19 If overland road, rail, 
and pipeline connections can be achieved, Chinese control over the port of Gwadar would anchor a 
direct connection between Xinjiang and the Indian Ocean. Developing this infrastructure could 
produce the first modern, multi-modal, continental line of operations—for commercial as well as 
military purposes—from the ocean to the previously land-locked regions of western China. 
Energy flows are a key component of this objective, which includes “entry” from the Indian Ocean 
and Persian Gulf as well as “exit” from the Asian continent. Secure energy flows are vital to China’s 
commercial and military objectives. Energy insecurity has long been an acute concern for Chinese 
strategists, epitomized by the so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” or China’s reliance on shipping that 
 
17 While the term translates directly to “estuary” and can be used for that technical purpose, it is also used in official and 
scholarly discourse to mean a port for accessing the ocean. For example, a description of Pakistan as a strong point on the 
Belt and Road by the PRC Ministry of Commerce frames the transport network through Pakistan as opening “an exit to the 
Indian Ocean” (打开一个面向印度洋的出海口). See 六、巴基斯坦与 “一带一路” 的关系 [“Six, Pakistan’s 
Relationship to the Belt and Road”], 商务历史 - 中华人民共和国商务部 [History of Commerce – PRC Ministry of 
Commerce], Undated, http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=bjstyydyldgx, (accessed July 31, 2020); Former chairman of 
Pakistan’s Board of Investment senator Saleem Mandviwalla explained to Chinese media that Xinjiang has gained an exit 
to the sea that can save time and effort through an overland route to Gwadar. 观察: 中国在巴基斯坦为新疆打造出海口 
[“Observer: China Creates an Exit to the Sea for Xinjiang in Pakistan”], BBC News – Chinese, April 21, 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/04/150421_ana_xi_pakistan. In official diplomatic exchanges, CPEC is 
commonly referred to as an agreement between China and Pakistan on the construction of infrastructure between Xinjiang 
in the north and the “Indian Ocean exit to the sea, Gwadar Port.” See: 各国大使谈两会: 世界将从中国改革中分享红利 
[“Ambassadors Discuss the Two Sessions: The World Will Share the Dividends of China’s Reforms”], 新华网 [Xinhua], 
March 5, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0305/c70731-24538827.html. For scholarly discussion of the term, 
see李靖宇 [Li Jingyu], et al, 关于中国在南亚区域选取印度洋出海口的战略推进构想 [“The Strategic Concept of 
Selecting Points for China’s Access to the Indian Ocean in the South Asia Region”], 中国海洋大学学报 [Journal of 
Ocean University of China], no. 5 (2012), pp. 29–39; 李鲁奇, 孔翔, 李一曼, 许杨 [Li Luqi, Kong Xiang, Li Yiman, and 
Yang Xu], “一带一路”倡议下中国与中亚合作的战略支点选择 [“Selection of Strategic Strongpoints for China-Central 
Asia Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”], 地理研究 [Geographical Research] vol. 38, no. 7 (2019), pp. 
1705-1719; 蔡晨宇[Cai Chenyu], 瓜达尔港的开发任重道远 [“The Development of Gwadar Port Has a Long Way to 
Go”], 中国港口 [China Ports], no. 1 (2017), pp. 17–20; 刘新华 [Liu Xinhua], 力量场效应、瓜达尔港与中国的西印度
洋利益 [“Force Field Effect: Gwadar Port and China’s Western Indian Ocean Interests”], 世界经济与政治论坛 [World 
Economics and Politics], vol. 53, no. 5 (2013), pp. 1–18. 
18 On China’s interior/exterior lines, see Peter Dutton, “A Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast Asia and the South 
China Sea,” Naval War College Review, vol. 69, no. 3 (2016), pp. 5-13. 
19 Kyaukphyu in Myanmar (the subject of a forthcoming CMSI China Maritime Report case study) is often discussed as 
the other alternative “exit to the sea” for China to the Indian Ocean. Some analysts include ports in Bangladesh 
(Chittagong in particular) as also serving this function, though Chinese access to these ports would necessarily traverse 
India—including territory disputed between China and India in Arunachal Pradesh. See Li Jingyu, et al, “The Strategic 
Concept of Selecting Points.”  
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might be interdicted on its way through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean.20 Overland 
transport from China to Gwadar can ostensibly “shed 85 percent of the distance of sea-only 
transport,”21 and avoid Malacca altogether. If sufficient Chinese maritime power can be projected 
into Hormuz, as leading civilian transport officials have proposed, a new and secure energy route 
appears possible.22 Creating an alternative, protected channel for flows of vital resources and trade 
could reduce China’s vulnerability to disruptions from foreign maritime powers, piracy, natural 
disasters, and other shocks to maritime transportation. The confluence of land and sea access to the 
greater Middle East afforded by Pakistan is unique and could be strategically significant. 
 
Figure 2. Gwadar-Xinjiang connection23 
 
20 There is some discussion in China as to whether this is an entirely rational concern, but the concept remains prevalent. 
For a well-informed discussion of it, see 薛力 [Xue Li], 马六甲困境"内涵辨析与中国的应对 [“Analysis of the Content 
of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and China’s Response”],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], no. 10 (2010), pp. 
117–140. For analysis specific to Gwadar, see 梅新育 [Mei Xinyu], 瓜达尔港与中国能源进口 [“Gwadar Port and 
China’s Energy Imports”], 财经杂志 [Caijing Magazine], December 20, 2016, 
http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20161220/4214477.shtml. 
21 A February 2015 report stating that China would imminently enjoy an 85 percent reduction in transit distance for 
imported oil garnered great attention on Chinese social media. 巴基斯坦第三大港口 4月运营我国石油运输线缩短 85% 
[“Pakistan’s Third Largest Port Will Go Into Operation in April, Reducing the Transit Distance of Chinese Oil by 85%”],
新浪财经 [Sina Finance], February 21, 2015, https://finance.sina.cn/chanjing/gdxw/2015-02-21/detail-
icczmvun6226180.d.html?from=wap; see also later skeptical commentary on it by a researcher from the PRC Ministry of 
Commerce (Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation): 梅新育 [Mei Xinyu], 中巴油气管线构
想 深陷经济安全误区 [“The Concept of China-Pakistan Oil and Gas Pipelines is Deeply Trapped in Misconceptions 
About Economic Security”] 第一财经日报 [First Financial Daily], August 18, 2015, 
https://www.yicai.com/news/4671232.html; 蔡晨宇[Cai Chenyu], 瓜达尔港的开发任重道远 [“The Development of 
Gwadar Port Has a Long Way to Go”], 中国港口 [China Ports], no. 1 (2017), p. 17.  
22 Song Dexing, Director of the Water Transportation Bureau at the PRC Ministry of Transport, calls for “improved 
maritime power and influence in the Strait [of Hormuz].” See 史春林, 李秀英 [Shi Chunlin and Li Xiuying], 霍尔姆斯海
峡安全对中国进口石油供应和运输影响 [“The Impact of the Security of the Strait of Hormuz on China’s Imported Oil 
Supply and Shipping”],” 中国软科学 [China Soft Sciences], no. 7 (2013), p. 15.  
23 “一带一路”期间与标杆—中巴经济走廊 [“‘One Belt One Road’ Flagship and Model—China-Pakistan Economic 




Objective #2: Shoring Up Peripheral Security and Stability  
Gwadar is also a key instrument for advancing Beijing’s interest in a secure and stable Pakistan. This 
interest has both foreign and domestic security policy drivers, arising from the states’ contiguous 
border regions of Xinjiang, in China, and Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (i.e., 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is disputed by India). This complex and unresolved border 
thus implicates both China’s long-standing internal campaign to stamp out “separatism, terrorism, 
and extremism” in its ethnic minority western regions, and its external objective to keep India 
strategically focused on Pakistan.24  
These enduring interests make Pakistan a high priority for Chinese leaders, who routinely reaffirm 
the bilateral relationship in hyperbolic terms.25 Pakistan is perennially China’s largest arms-
purchaser, and owes much of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities to the PRC.26 Since China’s 
border war with India in 1962, the Sino-Pakistani entente has functioned largely as a check on Indian 
power in the region, emphasizing military and intelligence cooperation, with mostly solid diplomatic 
support.27 This basic logic still obtains, but China’s broader regional objectives have led it to pursue 
a greatly augmented economic dimension to the relationship. 
Beginning in 2013, Chinese and Pakistani leaders announced that Gwadar port would be the 
centerpiece of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) (中巴经济走廊).28 Chinese 
planners envision the port as the oceanic node of a transportation network of road, rail, and pipeline 
infrastructure intended to traverse over 3,000 km of rugged, often insecure Pakistani terrain to link up 
with Chinese transport networks in Xinjiang province. From a northern terminus at Kashgar in 
western Xinjiang, goods conveyed from Gwadar can then, in theory, proceed on to massive PRC 
markets further east, and vice versa. Landlocked central Asian states—Afghanistan in particular—are 
among the intended beneficiaries of this aspirational transport system.29 Gwadar port is now heralded 
 
24 See Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015); Isaac Kardon, “China and Pakistan: 
Emerging Strains in the Entente Cordiale,” Project 2049 Occasional Paper, March 2011, https://project2049.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/china_pakistan_emerging_strains_in_the_entente_cordiale_kardon.pdf. 
25 Both sides routinely affirm that their “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” is “higher than the Himalayas,” 
“deeper than the Indian Ocean,” and “sweeter than honey.” See, for example, Hu Jintao, “Address at Islamabad 
Convention Center: ‘Carry on Traditional Friendship and Deepen All-Round Cooperation’,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China, November 24, 2006, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2757_663518/2758_663520/t285
917.shtml; “China, Pakistan Vow to Push Forward All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership to New High,” Xinhua, 
September 8, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/08/c_137454716.htm. 
26 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 
27 For a comprehensive discussion of this long-standing diplomatic entente, see Small, “The China-Pakistan Axis.” 
Recently, China declined to defend Pakistan against its listing on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” of 
countries needing to control financing for terrorism. Adnan Aamir, “The Grey List: More Trouble for Pakistan’s 
Economy,” The Lowy Institute Interpreter, July 18, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/grey-list-more-
trouble-pakistan-s-economy 
28 “Li Keqiang Urges Development of ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’,” South China Morning Post, May 23, 2013, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1244267/li-keqiang-urges-development-china-pakistan-economic-corridor 
29 A comprehensive study of CPEC and Gwadar conducted by researchers from Renmin University and reporters from 
Caijing Magazine argued that Gwadar was positioned to become “the port of choice for Central Asia, which will promote 
economic development in Central and South Asia.” See Renmin University Chongyang Institute and Caijing Magazine, 
“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Field Research Report,” p. 3. See also 唐孟生 [Tang Mengsheng], 唐孟生谈中巴经
济走廊：一带一路的旗舰与标杆 [“Tang Mengsheng Discusses CPEC: One Belt One Road’s Flagship and 
Benchmark”], Sina, May 26, 2016, http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2016-05-26/doc-ifxsqxxu4430007.shtml. 
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as “the second great monument of Pak-China friendship after the Karakorum Highway,” the high 
mountain road that connects the two countries.30 
China’s senior leadership has staked considerable capital and credibility on the success of Gwadar. 
During Xi Jinping’s April 2015 visit to Pakistan, he elevated CPEC to the highest priority and 
“flagship” of his “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).31 Xi named Gwadar as one of the four pillars of 
CPEC, and pledged $46 billion in Chinese investment over the next 15 years.32 This largesse is a 
major departure from China’s long-standing economic neglect of Pakistan.33 The huge and growing 
outlay of promised PRC investment in CPEC is estimated at as much as $87 billion, 34 though only 
$28.6 billion is allocated as of the latest official tally.35 Whatever the ultimate figure, it is not a trivial 
sum. Chinese leaders have opted for a strong dose of economic engagement to shore up this 
important relationship for the new era. Direct investment at Gwadar is estimated to be $1.62 billion 
to date, constituting a small but significant proportion of the PRC’s CPEC program.36 As the key 
project in Xi’s signature international program, Gwadar’s development holds immense symbolic as 
well as practical value for Chinese foreign policy. 
These huge investments are necessary, in PRC leadership’s estimation, because of Pakistan’s dire 
social and economic weakness. Xi has pledged a Chinese “blood transfusion” to shore up Pakistani 
instability.37 This medical metaphor is also used within China to describe the “disease” of Uyghur 
 
30 Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, “Year Book 2016-2017,” Islamabad, 2018, 
http://moma.gov.pk/userfiles1/file/YB_2016-17.pdf, p. 51 
31 张尼 [Zhang Ni], 习近平今启年内首访如何助推中巴经济走廊引关注 [“How Xi Jinping’s First Visit This Year Will 
Boost the CPEC”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 20, 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0420/c1001-
26869793.html  
32 Xi himself has played a key role in defining the nature of China-Pakistan economic initiatives. During his visit in 2015, 
he outlined four main lines of effort for CPEC: expanding Gwadar port and its free zone, constructing energy projects, 
developing nation-wide transport infrastructure, and forging bilateral industrial cooperation. See 崔小粟 [Cui Xiaosu], 习
近平在巴发表署名文章 描绘中巴关系新前景 [“Xi Jinping Publishes Signed Article in Pakistan Depicting New 
Prospects for China-Pakistan Relations”] 中国共产党新闻网 [China Central Party News Network], April 20, 2015, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0420/c385474-26870490-2.html; Subsequently, Xi has personally promoted the 
Gwadar project, citing it as an example of “continuous strengthening of facility connectivity” between ports and their 
connecting highways, railways, pipelines, and airports. 习近平出席“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛开幕式并发表主旨演
讲 [“Xi Jinping Attended The Opening Ceremony of the ‘Belt and Road’ International Cooperation Summit Forum and 
Delivered Keynote Speech”] 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], May 14, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-
05/14/content_5193673.htm#allContent 
33 Arif Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact,” Peaceworks, no. 135 (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2017), pp. 5-6; Small, “The China-Pakistan Axis,” pp. 93-116. 
34 The topline figure crept from $46 billion to $55 billion and later expanded to $62 billion. Salman Siddiqui, “CPEC 
investment pushed from $55b to $62b,” The Express Tribune, April 12, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1381733/cpec-
investment-pushed-55b-62b/. One recent assessment places the total at $87 billion, including CPEC projects that have 
been paused or cancelled. See Jon Hillman, Maesea Mccalpin, and Kendra Brock, “The China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor at Five.” CSIS Briefs, (April 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-five. 
35 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Yearbook 2018-2019,” Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform 
(Islamabad, 2020), https://www.pc.gov.pk/images/final_year_book.pdf, p. 144. 
36 王然 [Wang Ran], 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港已具备运营能力 [“Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Has Operating Capabilities”], 港口
经济 [Port Economy], no. 4 (2015), p. 53; 中国共和国商务部 [PRC Ministry of Commerce], 巴基斯坦与“一带一路”的
关系 [“Pakistan’s Relationship With the Belt and Road”], 商务历史 [The History of Commerce], Ch. 6, 2020, 
http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=bjstyydyldgx 
37 Tang Mengsheng notes that of 51 total investments announced with MOUs, 36 are projects currently designated as 




Muslim separatism.38 Chinese analysts describe the connection of the port to China as “a large 
artery” supporting Pakistan’s health—and China’s, too.39 Such emphasis on the basic unity of 
internal and external security reflects Xi Jinping’s conception of “holistic national security,” rooted 
in long-standing Chinese strategic thinking about its western frontiers.40 According to the former 
PRC Ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, the CPEC program “will improve the economic and social 
development of the backward areas of Pakistan and China. The situation provides a ‘cure’ for the 
terrorist threat in the region.”41 
Chinese rulers have long viewed economic development along China’s western periphery as a means 
to maintain stability. General Liu Yazhou, political commissar of the PLA National Defense 
University, captured this long-standing conception of China’s near abroad, stating that “we should 
see the western regions not as a frontier but rather as our advancing hinterlands.”42 From this 
perspective, Pakistan is part of the same socio-economic and security system as Xinjiang. Chinese 
security leadership considers instability in Pakistan to be a significant threat to PRC domestic 
stability, in large part because of its close connections to Xinjiang.43 As the People’s Armed Police 
(PAP) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Qin Tian put it, “the trend of foreign terrorists returning to 
the country is obvious. Xinjiang is under attack.”44 Chinese analysts consider Pakistan a major vector 
for radicalization of Chinese Muslims. Beijing has thus long relied on Pakistan to “mediate major 
elements of its counter-terrorism policy.”45  
The economic program of CPEC (of which Gwadar is a component) is best understood then as an 
instrument of Beijing’s security policy. The aim is to stabilize and pacify Xinjiang by integrating its 
development with countries on China’s periphery. The development of an Indian Ocean port is 
fundamental to the overarching goal of internal stability and peripheral security. To understand why 
and how first requires an understanding of the port and its connecting infrastructure. 
 
38 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Domestic Repression: China’s 
Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” International Security, vol. 44, no. 3 (2019), pp. 9-47. 
39 Cai Chenyu, “Gwadar Port Has A Long Way To Go,” p. 17 
40 For an assortment of Xi statements on his “holistic national security outlook,” see: 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 习近平关于总
体国家安全观论述摘编 [Selected Works of Xi Jinping on The Holistic National Security Outlook] (Beijing: Central Party 
Publishing, 2018); see also Timothy Heath, “The ‘Holistic Security Concept’: The Securitization of Policy and Increasing 
Risk of Militarized Crisis,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 15, no. 12 (June 19, 2015), 
https://jamestown.org/program/the-holistic-security-concept-the-securitization-of-policy-and-increasing-risk-of-
militarized-crisis/. 
41 陆树林 [Lu Shulin], 中巴经济走廊: “一带一路” 的 旗舰项目和示范项目 [“China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A 
Flagship and Exemplary Project of the Belt and Road”], 印度洋经集体研究 [Indian Ocean Economic and Political 
Review], no. 4 (2015), p. 104. 
42 刘亚洲 [Liu Yazhou], 西部论 [“On the West”] 凤凰周刊 [Phoenix Weekly], August 5, 2010,  
http://risechina.blogspot.com/2013/03/blog-post_9585.html 
43 “Xi takes an integrated view of the international and domestic counter-terrorism situation,” according to then-Chief of 
Staff of the People’s Armed Police. 秦天 [Qin Tian). 21世纪前期反恐形势 与中国反恐军事力量建设 [“The Anti-
Terrorism Situation in the Early 21st Century and the Building of China’s Anti-Terrorist Military”] 中国军事科学 [China 
Military Science), no. 1 (2017), p. 53 
44 Ibid., p. 52 
45 Andrew Small, “China and Counter-Terrorism: Beyond Pakistan?” in Michael Clarke (ed.), Terrorism and 




Image 1: Gwadar Bay with Port inset46 
 
Image 2: Gwadar Port and Surrounds47 
  
 
46 瓜达尔港 [“Gwadar Port”], 中国交通建设股份有限公司 [China Communications Construction Co., Ltd.], December 
14, 2018, http://www.ccccltd.cn/zt/qzggkfsszn/ssxzdgc/201812/t20181214_95426.html. 




Port Capacity & Characteristics  
The port at Gwadar has been in operation since 2008 but has yet to see regular commercial service. 
Situated in the east bay of a hammer-shaped peninsula, it has historically supported artisanal fishing 
for the local population. That population has not yet been displaced by the industrial-scale 
commercial port operation intended by the project developers. Indeed, Gwadar port’s commercial 
throughput is not yet reported by any major industry sources. The port and its adjacent free trade and 
export processing zone nonetheless continue as the subjects of voluminous reporting in Pakistani and 
Chinese media while incremental upgrades and expansions take place.  
Port Development 
The dream of a deep-water port at Gwadar has been long in the making. A survey by the United 
States Geological Service in 1954 demonstrated the suitability of the site’s natural harbor for 
development as a port, after which Pakistan negotiated the purchase of the Gwadar site from the 
Sultanate of Oman for $3 million in 1958.48 Pakistani officials marketed the prospective port at 
Gwadar to foreign firms throughout the intervening decades, and nearly reached a deal in the late 
1990s with the U.S. oil and gas firm Unocal, which reportedly aimed to use Gwadar as hub for 
natural gas pipelines spanning the region.49 Pakistani leaders were unable to secure capital and 
technical expertise for the port’s development until August 2001, when PRC Prime Minister Zhu 
Rongji committed Chinese support for the project.50  
The China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC)51 was the general contractor on the initial 
development of the site, breaking ground in March 2002.52 CHEC inherited a design from a British 
firm, but opted to redesign “in line with Chinese port construction standards,” according to the 
general manager and chief engineer of the project, Sun Ziyu, who noted that it was “built to 
specifications 70 percent higher than the standards of the United Kingdom.”53 Sun claimed that they 
were not the low bidder, but rather offered the highest quality project (though there is no public 
record of open bidding on the project).54 One strength of the Chinese bid was the financial backing of 
state. The leading PRC policy bank supporting overseas construction, China’s Export Import Bank 
(Exim Bank), financed the port construction project with a $50 million grant, a $50 commercial 
 
48 “Gwadar Port: ‘History-Making Milestones,’” Dawn, April 14, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/297994. 
49 The firm reportedly engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations with the Pakistani government during the 1990s, hoping 
to use the port to connect to the energy-risk Caspian Sea. 郝洲 [Hao Zhou], 瓜达尔港曲折起航 [“Gwadar Port Sets 
Sail”], 财经 [Caijing), May 5, 2017, http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20170505/4268608.shtml. Another U.S. firm also 
signed an investment memorandum of understanding for a $460 fishing port and modern industrial fishing fleet, but also 
failed to close the deal. See Syed A. Aslam, “$460 m Forbes Project is Dead,” Pakistan Economist, no. 30 (August 1, 
1999), https://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue1999/issue30/i&e1.htm. 
50 朱镕基会见巴基斯坦财政部长和交通部长 [“Zhu Rongji Meets with Pakistani Minister of Finance and Minister of 
Transportation”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], August 9, 2001, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20010809/531795.html; Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” 
51 CHEC is a subsidiary of the leading central SOE working on global port projects, China Communications Construction 
Company (CCCC) (中国交通建设股份有限公司). 
52 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港口项目工程简介 [“Introduction to the Gwadar, Pakistan Port Project”], 中华人民共和国商务部 
[PRC Ministry of Commerce], May 5, 2004, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bi/200405/20040500216204.shtml. 
53 李强 [Li Qiang], 中港董事长：瓜达尔港让中国工程走向世界 [“China Harbour Director: Gwadar Port brings 
Chinese engineering to the world”], 世界博览 [World Expo], September 27, 2011, 
http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/sjbl/detail_2011_09/27/9505763_0.shtml, p. 1. No other sources report on the British design 
firm.  
54 Ibid., p. 1. 
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credit, and a $98 million state credit repayable over 15 years, with Pakistan providing the remaining 
$50 million for the $248 million project.55  
The project faced significant security and technical challenges, including fatal terrorist attacks 
against the Chinese engineers and laborers working on site.56 Lacking fresh water, reliable electricity, 
and modern roads, the Chinese laborers also made do with infrequent shipments from the PRC; 
project equipment came in on a semi-submersible barge from the mainland because it could not be 
conveyed overland.57 These threats and obstacles notwithstanding, CHEC completed Phase I of 
construction in the spring of 2007, three months ahead of schedule, but $50 million over budget.58  
The facility features a 4.7 km approach channel dredged to a depth of 14.5 meters (m), with a turning 
basin with a maximum allowable length overall (LOA) of 295m.59 The 602m continuous quay wall 
includes three 200m multipurpose ship berths that can accommodate up to 50,000 DWT vessels with 
a maximum 12.5m draught.60 The cargo berths are outfitted for container, RO-RO, breakbulk, and 
heavy project cargo; a 100m service berth is immediately west of the quay.61 The designed capacity 
is 137,000 TEU (containerized cargo) per year, and 868,000 tons of general and bulk cargo per 
 
55 巴基斯坦政府正积极寻求外国公司运营瓜达尔港 [“Pakistani Government is Actively Seeking Foreign Companies to 
Operate Gwadar Port”], 中国驻巴基斯坦大使馆经济商务处 [PRC Embassy in Pakistan Economic and Commercial 
Office], February 26, 2006, http://pk.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/200602/20060201601928.shtml. For more information 
on the loans and grants, see A. Dreher, A. Fuchs, B.C. Parks, A.M. Strange, and M.J. Tierney, “China Exim Bank 
Provides USD 98 Million State Credit for Gwadar Port Project, Pakistan (Linked to #38995 and #35124), Aid, China, and 
Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: 
AidData, 2017.  
56 “3 Engineers killed in car bomb in Pakistan,” China Daily, May 3, 2004, 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-05/03/content_328070.htm; PRC Ministry of Commerce, “Pakistan’s 
Relationship With the ‘Belt and Road” 
57 Li Qiang, “Gwadar Port Brings Chinese Engineering to The World.” 
58 The project cost later increased to $298 million. See “Gwadar Port: ‘History-Making Milestones;’” Li Qiang, “Gwadar 
Port Brings Chinese Engineering to the World,” p. 2. 
59 Port characteristics drawn from IHS Markit, “Gwadar Port Detail,” Seaweb Ports, accessed May 1, 2020. China 
Communications Construction Company subsidiary Shanghai Dredging Co. Ltd. spent five years dredging the port. Phase 
I was initiated in May 2002 and dredged the channel to 8 meters. Phase II later dredged the channel to 10-11 meters. For a 
personal account of the dredging work by company management, see 在巴基斯坦瓜达尔港疏浚航道的日子 [“The Time 
We Dredged Gwadar Port’s Channel in Pakistan”], 东南商报 [Southeast Business News], May 13, 2017, 
http://daily.cnnb.com.cn/dnsb/html/2017-05/13/content_1049758.htm?div=-1. This company has undertaken other projects 
of national importance, such as dredging artificial islands in the disputed Spratly Island Group of the South China Sea. See 
百年上航 卓越领航 [“A Hundred Years of Shanghai Dredging Co., Leading in Excellence”], 中交上海航道局有限公司 
[CCCC Shanghai Dredging Co. Ltd.], September 7, 2018, http://www.sh-syh.org/node2/shsyh/qywh/u1ai3817.html. 
60 These are the numbers available from IHS Markit’s Seaweb Ports entry for Gwadar. The COPHC website lists 12.5m 
for maximum draught and 70,000 for maximum DWT, but given that IHS Markit is a paid service for commercial 
operators, it is likely that the COPHC-published figures are inflated, or at best anticipatory of future dredging and 
expansion. See China Overseas Port Holdings Company, Pakistan, “Gwadar International Terminals Limited,” 
http://cophcgwadar.com/gitl.aspx, accessed May 1, 2020. The Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs annual report also 
lists 12.5m as the draught, but 50,000 as the maximum DWT. See Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Maritime Affairs, 
“Year Book 2016-2017,” http://moma.gov.pk/userfiles1/file/YB_2016-17.pdf, p. 2. 
61 IHS Markit, “Gwadar,” Seaweb Ports, accessed April 20, 2020. The current port operator, China Overseas Port 
Holdings, claims in its brochure that the facility can handle 70,000 DWT vessels, but this is not the current 
recommendation from commercial sources like IHS Markit. See China Overseas Ports Holding Company Pakistan (Pvt.) 
Ltd., “A Deep Sea Port Exploring Global Opportunities,” COPHC Company Profile, 
http://cophcgwadar.com/files/pdf/COPHC_Company_Profile.pdf, p. 14. The overall port area is 640,000 m2 and includes 
48,278 m2  for container stacking, a 28,669 m2 open storage yard, 3,750 m2 of warehousing, an 1,800 m2  hazardous cargo 
storage yard, and 400 reefer plugs for refrigerated cargos. 
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year.62 These are the modest port facilities currently operating, with only minor augmentation well 
over a decade later. 
Port Management 
The Gwadar Port Authority tendered international bids in 2006, and the Port of Singapore Authority 
(PSA) won a 40-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) lease for Gwadar port in 2007.63 CHEC and 
Dubai Ports World also bid on the project, but PSA was awarded the concession on the strength of its 
reputation as a leading global port operator.64 Under the agreement, PSA was to receive 91 percent of 
cargo operations revenues and 85 percent of the free zone revenues.65 As part of this concession, PSA 
agreed to develop Phase II of the port, pledging a $550 million investment in the construction of four 
additional container berths, a bulk cargo terminal, two oil terminals, a roll-on roll-off terminal, and a 
grain terminal over the next five years.66 Stymied by political, engineering, and legal obstacles, PSA 
failed to implement Phase II expansion.67 The port was only utilized for bulk cargos of fertilizer, 
urea, and wheat imported directly by the government-operated Trading Corporation of Pakistan, 
which had to subsidize these transactions.68 In 2011, PSA entered negotiations to exit the project. 
By February 2013, PSA had opted to sell all of its equity in the port to the Chinese state-owned firm 
China Overseas Port Holdings Company, Ltd. (COPHC).69 When COPHC took over the port from 
PSA in February 2013, the facilities were in disrepair. Engineers from the China Communications 
Construction Corporation-Fourth Harbor Engineering Investigation and Design Institute Co., Ltd. 
(CCCC-FHDI, which was involved in the survey and planning of the port’s construction from 2002-
2007) assessed the port after the Chinese take-over and found the main pier in sound structural 
condition, but almost everything else had been neglected and was in various stages of decay. The 
approach had silted up to only 12.1 meters (from 14.5 m), steel components of the loading equipment 
and cranes were “severely corroded,” quay crane hydraulic systems were leaking, and yard 
 
62 Pakistan Ministry of Ports and Shipping, Gwadar Port Authority, “Gwadar Port & CPEC,” A Presentation to 
Parliamentary Committee on CPEC, November 28, 2015, 
http://www.na.gov.pk/cpec/sites/default/files/presentations/Parliamentary%20Committee%20on%20CPECNew.pdf, p. 9. 
63 China Overseas Ports Holding Company Pakistan (PVT) Ltd., “Brief Summary of Development: Gwadar Port and Free 
Zone,” Presentation delivered at PRC Embassy, Pakistan, Islamabad, 26 October 2018, http://www.pakistan-
china.com/wb-pci-pci/demo/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/cpec-3.pdf. 
64 Some reports speculated that PSA was chosen over CHEC because then-President Pervez Musharraf sought to assuage 
American concerns about leasing a strategic asset to the PRC. See Declan Welsh, “Chinese Company Will Run Strategic 
Pakistani Port,” New York Times, January 31, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/chinese-firm-will-
run-strategic-pakistani-port-at-gwadar.html. 
65 K. Raffat Zaheer, “Development and Operations of the Port of Gwadar,” International Federation of Shipmasters’ 
Associations working paper, 2008, http://www.ifsma.org/tempannounce/aga33/Gwadar.pdf. 
66 “SC Revives Issue of Controversial Contract for Gwadar Port” Dawn, November 3, 2010, 
https://www.dawn.com/news/892058. 
67 宋笛 [Song Di], 看见瓜达尔港：世界最大的深水港 [“Behold Gwadar Port: The World’s Largest Deepwater Port”], 
中国企业报 [China Enterprise News], February 17, 2016, http://www.cccnews.cn/mtjkj/201602/t20160217_45539.html. 
68 Song Di, “Behold Gwadar Port”; Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” 
69 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” The principal complaint from PSA was the failure of the Pakistani Navy to turn 
over a large plot (584 acres of land at Shamba Ismail) that was meant to be developed as warehousing space adjacent to 
the port. Pakistani analysts differ as to whether this or broader security, commercial, or other political concerns were the 
principal causes of PSA’s failure to perform planned expansion and operate the port successfully. See also “Putting 
Economics in Command,” Dawn, September 2, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/746500/putting-economics-in-
command; “Gwadar Port To Be Taken Over By Chinese Company: Minister Informs Senate Body,” Business Recorder, 
August 29, 2012, https://fp.brecorder.com/2012/08/201208291231513/. 
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equipment “urgently needed maintenance.”70 As late as 2016, the port’s cargo-handling equipment 
was reportedly unusable due to neglect; oil storage tanks were rusted over and non-functional, and 
“mountains of garbage filled the port area.”71 Still, shortly after Xi Jinping’s landmark trip and 
announcement of the CPEC project, COPHC finalized a new 40-year lease on the Gwadar port in 
November 2015.72   
COPHC had no prior experience owning or operating a port terminal before taking over at Gwadar.73 
Indeed, the firm was incorporated and registered (in Hong Kong) in August 2012.74 According to 
COPHC’s chairman, Zhang Baozhong, the firm “was specially-designed and purposely-built…for 
Gwadar port by the Chinese government.”75 Disclosures to the Hong Kong Exchange where the firm 
is domiciled describe it as a private corporation in which Zhang himself owns one third of the issued 
shares (worth only $500,000 USD).76 The firm is otherwise opaque, and unwilling to respond to 
Pakistani journalists’ requests for further information.77 Public documents do not list any identifiable 
government actors in the firm’s management or ownership structure.78 Nonetheless, the “state-
owned” status of the port operator appears to be a selling point for developments surrounding 
Gwadar, indicating a degree of PRC government commitment, perhaps intended to assure investors.79  
This lease reportedly replicates the arrangements of the earlier PSA deal, with 91 percent of port 
revenues allotted to COPHC, 9 percent to the federal Pakistani government, and nothing to the 
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Exchange Commission. “The Mysterious China Overseas Port Company,” Business Recorder Research, February 18, 
2018, https://www.brecorder.com/2018/02/19/399768/the-mysterious-china-overseas-ports-holding-company/. 
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Baloch provincial government.80 The COPHC lease also retains all of the PSA-negotiated 
arrangements and preferential conditions—“even PSA’s corporate structure for operation and 
management of ports and free zones—we have copied them intact,” according to a COPHC executive 
in Pakistan.81 PSA is among the leading global terminal operators, and has had the world’s highest 
throughput of containers through its terminals since 2008.82 Yet this world-class firm was unable (or 
unwilling) to successfully bring the port into commercial operation, calling into question the business 
case for COPHC’s subsequent efforts. 
Port Utilization 
Commercial activity at Gwadar has been quite limited, as of June 2020. While industry reporting 
does not cover throughput or utilization at the port, available evidence makes clear it is operating 
well below its designed capacity. According to the Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, cargo 
throughput actually decreased after COPHC took over the lease in 2013. Only 1.42 million tons of 
cargo and 99 ships came through Gwadar in the entire five years from 2013-2017 (the last time 
throughput was officially reported).83 By contrast, in the second year of the port’s operation under 
PSA in 2009, a total of 2.25 million tons of cargo were imported through Gwadar by 70 ships. The 
port has generated only $2.26 million in revenues during the period since the COPHC takeover in 
2013, and only about $200,000 went to the Gwadar Port Authority, according to reports from the 
Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs in spring 2019.84  
“Most of the time,” wrote a Chinese industry analyst in 2017, “Gwadar port is basically idle.”85 In 
the early years of COPHC operation, industry analysts described the problem at Gwadar as “ships but 
no cargo, or cargo but no ships.”86 Three years after assuming control of the port, the Chinese 
operator handled its first commercial cargo vessel: the Sinotrans Shipping bulk carrier Changhang 
Hanhai, which offloaded 30,000 tons of engineering equipment and building materials at berth 2 in 
October 2016.87 This limited activity consisted primarily of cargo for construction on the port and its 
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surrounding facilities.88 Cargo throughput for import was not yet economically feasible. Engineers 
from CCC-FHDI reported in 2017 that cargo passing through Gwadar port required government 
subsidies of twenty USD per ton.89 
Actual commercial utilization began in 2018, when COPHC and COSCO announced the start of a 
regular container service. The MS TIGER arrived at Gwadar on March 7, 2018, accompanied by two 
Pakistani naval vessels and much fanfare.90 The vessel subsequently loaded an undisclosed number 
of frozen seafood containers and left for Jebel Ali, UAE that same day. This “Karachi-Gwadar 
Express Service” was intended to run every Wednesday. However, according to COSCO logs online, 
the service ceased after only 9 such transits, in May 2018.91  
Limited equipment upgrades have improved the handling capacity at the port. Three new quay cranes 
arrived mid-July 2018.92 These quay cranes have permitted the modest uptick in the frequency of 
ship visits, including for dry bulk items for which the cranes are well-suited.93 In 2019, seven 
container vessels visited Gwadar; as of May 2020, three container vessels, two bulk vessels, and one 
liquid petroleum gas (LPG) carrier have called on the port, though there is no LPG terminal. Still, 
CCDI-FHDI engineers reported in 2019 that “due to the lack of specialized coal, ore, container, oil 
and gas berths in Gwadar port, the types of cargo handled are relatively simple. The role assumed in 
Pakistan's maritime trade is not yet prominent.”94 
The COSCO container service appears to have been resuscitated in early 2020,95 though firm 
representatives say the line often skips Gwadar.96 Throughput may improve marginally as enterprises 
begin operating out of the initial section of the free zone, but full utilization of the port is not on the 
horizon. 
 
88 王琳 [Wang Lin], 一带一路倡议下，瓜达尔每天都在变化 [“Gwadar Changes Everyday Under the One Belt, One 
Road Initiative”], 第一财经 [China Business Network], May 8, 2017, http://www.yicai.com/news/5280826.html. For 
example, one Zhejiang-based contractor for electrical cable pipe conduits has reported its preparations for delivery of 
piping to Gwadar port’s free zone in April 2017. See 驰讯管业中标瓜达尔港电缆管道顺利起运装船 [“Successful 
Bidder Zhuxun Piping Industries Load Up Ships for Gwadar Port’s Electrical Cable Piping”], April 14, 2017, 
http://zjcxgy.com/news/html/?424.html. 
89 Xi Fang, et al, “SWOT Analysis and Development Measures for Gwadar,” pp. 1-2. 
90 “First-ever container vessel under CPEC arrives at Gwadar Port,” The News International, March 7, 2018, 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/289561-first-ever-container-vessel-under-cpec-arrives-at-gwadar-port. 
91 COSCO SHIPPING Lines, “KARACHI GWADAR GULF SERVICE (KGS),” https://news.cpecb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/KGS-LTS-updated.xlsx, accessed June 6, 2020. 
92 Staff Writer, “New Cranes Arrive at Gwadar Port,” July 13, 2017, www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-
detail?id=MzQ1Nw==. 
93 An October 2018 COPHC report to Pakistani officials claimed that two 50,000 DWT Handymax vessels can be 
accommodated simultaneously, handling bulk-cargo, general cargo, containers, and roll-on roll-off “efficiently” (COPHC, 
“Brief Summary of Development of Gwadar Port & Free Zone,” PRC Embassy Islamabad, October 26, 2018, 
http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/brief-summary-of-development-of-gwadar-port--free-zone-(oct-2018)/NjEzMw==. 
94 周惊慧 [Zhou Jinghui], et al. 瓜达尔港发展及布局研究 [“Research on Development and Layout of Gwadar Port”], 水
运工程 [Port & Waterway Engineering] 9 no. 560 (2018), p. 126. 
95 A search of COSCO Shipping’s “Sailing Schedules” by city pairs found two container vessels, the Liberian flagged 
“Manet” and Tuvalu-flagged “Diyala” traveling between Jebel Ali and Gwadar every 5 to 9 days in May-June 2020, 
https://elines.coscoshipping.com/ebusiness/sailingSchedule. 






Image 3: Gwadar Port and Free Zone, April 202097 
Free Zone Development 
The port is designed to incorporate an adjacent free trade and export processing zone modeled on 
Shekou, the port complex at the heart of the PRC’s Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.98 The basic 
“Shekou Model” (蛇口模式) is a port surrounded by a logistics and free trade zone, and bolstered by 
a purpose-built commercial and residential city to support the work-force for the whole complex. 
This “port-park-city” is designed to reproduce a thriving, Chinese business ecosystem that can 
generate and process the trade required to make the port and its hinterlands prosper.99 Like Shenzhen, 
Gwadar’s development begins from humble origins as a fishing village.100  While Gwadar is plainly 
lacking most of the other crucial ingredients that make Shenzhen the economic miracle that it is, 
Chinese firms are nonetheless advocating a similar approach there.101 
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模式”的形成 [“Formation of the China Merchants Port 'Shekou Model' of Development”], 国家航海 [National 
Navigation], (November 2017), pp. 39-54; 何继江, 刘宁 [He Jijiang and Liu Ning], 蛇口模式:一种社会技术创新 
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The free zone is conceived as an integral part of the overall port project. COPHC secured a 43-year 
lease in 2015 to develop a 2,281-acre tax-free industrial, logistics, warehousing, and export zone 
north of the port, called the “Gwadar Free Zone.”102 It is operated by a COPHC subsidiary, Gwadar 
Free Zone Company, which intends to interface between Chinese firms and the local government, 
while providing utilities and security for the site.103 Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Shahid Abbasi 
presided over the inauguration of Phase I of this project in January 2018, a 60-acre initial commercial 
logistics zone on the western flank of the existing port facility.  
The zone is meant to attract Chinese and Pakistani firms to the port. COPHC’s chairman, Zhang 
Baozhong, claims thirty-plus Chinese and Pakistani firms have already invested nearly $500 million 
to use the facilities. COPHC posted an online investment guide with all of the registration procedures 
required for operating in the free zone, meant to attract Chinese firms and streamline the process for 
getting into the Pakistani market.104 Incentives include the possibility of 100 percent ownership for 
foreign investors, a 23-year tax holiday on any revenues from operations in the zone, 99-year land-
leases, duty-free imports and exports, a “world-class infrastructure and security arrangement,” and 
other promised business perks like flexible visas and ready-to-use office, industrial, and warehousing 
space.105  
The PRC Embassy in Islamabad reports that a wide range of state-owned and private firms, both 
Chinese and Pakistani, have submitted applications to become free zone companies.106 Among them 
are the Shandong Linyi Overseas Investment Company, which has begun preparatory work on a trade 
exhibition hall and commercial logistics park.107 Some large state-owned enterprises are involved at 
the Gwadar free zone, including the China Merchants Group and China Communications 
Construction Corp., but most of the contracts have reportedly gone to smaller local SOEs and private 
firms.108 
In January 2018, the Gwadar Free Zone desalination facility entered operation.109 After upgrades, the 
plant now processes 220,000 gallons per day. 110 Chinese sources claim the plant’s water supply and 
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drainage system will support not only the port complex, but also parts of the surrounding community, 
which is plagued by persistent water shortages.111 Other efforts around the Gwadar Free Zone include 
schools, hospitals, and commercial and residential real estate.112  
Although the free zone intends to foster new industries, the long-standing fisheries industry was the 
first to attract Chinese investment and trading activity at the port. A Xinjiang-based fishing company, 
Yufei International Fishing Company, invested in building a fish processing and cold-storage center, 
kicking off construction in the initial section of the free zone in May 2017.113 The firm plans to ship 
frozen seafood from Gwadar in reefer containers and truck it over the roughly ten-day, 1,800-km 
route through the Khunjerab Pass into Xinjiang Province.114 Western China got its “first taste of the 
Indian Ocean” at a promotional event for Gwadar’s seafood in Karamay, Xinjiang on May 20, 2017. 
For this event, however, Yufei flew two tons of seafood from Gwadar to Urumqi via Karachi and 
Beijing, arriving on Karamay citizens’ tables 34 hours later.115 There is no subsequent reporting on 
overland transport of Gwadar fish, though the container service has exported it to regional markets.116 
Phase II and Beyond 
Phase II expansions to the port and free zone are planned, but little progress is evident. One common 
sentiment among Chinese analysts is that the infrastructure must precede the commercial activity. In 
the words of an economics reporter who led a major study of the port: “in the longer term, when 
China lays out the basic infrastructure, it needs more participants to form a self-operating economic 
ecology. Relying solely on China’s unilateral blood transfusions is unsustainable. If you want to 
attract more foreign investors, you need to take your time and wait for Pakistan’s economic 
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fundamentals to be revitalized.”117 The medical metaphor of Pakistan as a sick patient is indicative of 
some of the socio-economic and security concerns that have hampered expeditious development at 
the port and free zone. 
 
Figure 3. Gwadar city master plan118 
Phase II plans include a further nine berths to the east of the existing multipurpose berths, including a 
container terminal with four berths, a grain terminal, a bulk terminal, and two oil terminals on the 
northeast of the bay.119 COPHC has submitted a proposal to construct the breakwaters needed to 
carry out this expansion, but the business plan remains under review by the Pakistan Ministry of 
Ports and Security.120 Indeed, reviews and approvals from Pakistani officials have been a source of 
major frustration for COPHC, which all but begged for support from Pakistan’s Federal Board of 
Revenue in a recent presentation at the PRC Embassy in Islamabad.121 
Trade is hampered by customs regulations that thus far have limited imports to only 20 specified 
items. Pakistan’s bureaucracy also has a complicated licensing system for potential investors in the 
free zone, such that only 12 of the 30 registered investors had been licensed (as of the last report in 
October 2018).122 COPHC noted that these are among the obstacles “involved in non-operation of 
Gwadar Port for commercial purposes” and claim that desired actions by Pakistani officials will 
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allow the “operationalization of Gwadar Port.”123 
The natural sedimentation of the port means that continuous dredging is required for sufficient depth 
to be maintained for larger vessels to call.124 Officially, a COPHC bid to conduct further dredging of 
channels and berths is under review by the Pakistan Ministry of Ports and Shipping and the Gwadar 
Port Authority.125 No contract has yet been publicized, but maintenance dredging occurs periodically 
in order to maintain the current depth and provide landfill for port projects.126 Recent channel 
dredging observed in Spring of 2019 is reportedly being done for construction of the East Bay 
Expressway.127 A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson publicized this dredging 
activity, noting that it was conducted by one of the vessels involved in China’s land reclamation in 
the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, the M/V Tian Bai owned by CCCC subsidiary 
Tianjin Dredging Company.128 One Chinese analyst claims COSCO would begin to operate more 
regularly out of Gwadar if vessels larger than the current maximum of 50,000 DWT (Handymax) 
could use the facility.129 Given the low utilization of the port at present, it is hardly certain that larger 
ships would call even with adequate facilities. 
Satellite imagery shows signs of new construction occurring adjacent to the port, with current focus 
on roadways and storage laydown areas. Most observed construction appears to be focused on land 
preparation, roads, piping, and structures of the initial section of the free zone. Substantial land 
reclamation must be completed before work on much of the other infrastructure can even be initiated. 
The land on which planners envision the secondary container terminal, the grain and bulk terminals, 
and the oil terminal, does not yet exist. Continued dredging and deepening of the approach channel 
could provide some of the landfill for such reclamation.130   
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Competition from Other Ports 
Pakistan already has two large ports in a major urban area, relatively well-connected to their 
hinterland, that are also being actively expanded by Chinese firms: Karachi and Port Muhammad Bin 
Qasim (Port Qasim). Virtually all maritime trade in Pakistan goes through Karachi or Qasim, some 
600 km to the east in relatively prosperous Punjab province.131 Commercial data providers still do not 
bother reporting statistics on Gwadar’s throughput, because according to engineers from CCCC-
FHDI, Gwadar’s cargos account for less than one percent of the roughly 100 million tons of annual 
throughput in Pakistani ports in recent years.132 Yet despite its underutilization to date, the project’s 
backers claim Gwadar will handle a staggering 300 million to 400 million tons annually once all 
phases of construction are complete by 2030.133  
Sited in the largest Pakistani city by population, Karachi’s port is the nation’s principle maritime 
trade link. The second most active hub is Port Qasim, which is 35 km east of Karachi city but 
sometimes considered to be a part of the Karachi port complex. Both are linked up with Pakistan’s 
rail and road system on the better developed eastern side of the country. The Gwadar Port Authority 
and Chinese engineers promote Gwadar as a response to growing demand and lack of space for 
Karachi’s future expansion, and the geographic disadvantages of Qasim.134  
The claim that these established ports cannot expand to meet capacity demand, however, is belied by 
Chinese firms’ active pursuit of expansion at both sites. Chinese firms have recently pursued a 
container terminal expansion at Karachi (beginning 2019)135 and the construction under CPEC of two 
660 mW coal-fired power plants and a coal-berth at Port Qasim (begun 2015, made operational in 
2017 and 2018).136 Bidding for a floating LNG terminal expansion project at Qasim is open and 
attracting international bids.137 Qasim and Karachi are actively under development and evidently still 
present a value proposition for Chinese and other foreign firms. 
If Gwadar has any competitive advantages over these established facilities, they lie in the PRC’s 
intimate connections to Pakistan. Its success will depend on the distinctive characteristics of China’s 
strategic strongpoints—particularly the coordinated efforts of the Chinese party-state and business 
enterprises to realize their comprehensive development goals. For Gwadar to thrive, it will depend on 
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robust transport networks that link it to markets and resources. Functional road, rail, air, and pipeline 
infrastructure are essential to expanding the hinterland served by the port. 
Transport Infrastructure 
The promise of a direct commercial connection between the Indian Ocean and Xinjiang province has 
fixated Chinese leaders and analysts—especially as a means of circumventing the much-hyped 
“Malacca Dilemma.”138 But the Balochistan hinterlands are sparsely populated and barely developed, 
making it essential to develop modern transport links to convey goods and natural resources between 
the port and more substantial inland markets.139 Progress in constructing transport infrastructure 
providing connectivity to the port has been halting. Nearby the port, the obstacles to infrastructure 
development include poor power and water supply, difficulty in securing permits and support from 
local government, persistent terrorist attacks on projects and personnel, and difficulty securing 
capital given those risks and continued non-performance of the port itself.140 Further afield, it is the 
engineering challenges that loom large, especially as the terrain climbs the Himalayan plateau in 
Pakistan’s north and east and crosses the Khunjerab Pass in order to connect to PRC rail, road, and 
pipeline networks.  
Work to date has yet to meaningfully connect the port to inland transport networks. Instead, CPEC 
construction has largely focused on “early harvest” projects that prioritize power generation. A 
CPEC “Joint Commission” consisting of government and commercial actors from both sides was 
established in August 2013.141 Its biannual meetings have led to a prioritization on energy generation 
and transmission. Power plants, mostly coal, and related infrastructure have largely been constructed 
along the already better-developed central and eastern corridors, rather than the western corridor 
traversing Balochistan.142  
Gwadar and its hinterlands have been neglected in favor of the relatively better-off and more 
developed eastern portions of the country, Punjab and Sindh. This prioritization largely reflects 
political goals of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (2013-2017), who ran on a platform of ending 
power blackouts (his slogan was “Bright Pakistan”).143 Sharif initiated CPEC with a vision of 
leveraging Chinese firms’ extraordinary capacity in coal power generation. This prioritization of the 
program differs from that of his successor, Imran Khan, who has shown more interest in industrial 
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parks than power plants.144 The following section summarizes the limited progress to date in 
connecting Gwadar to road, rail, air, and pipeline networks. 
Road Networks 
The most immediate priority for Gwadar’s connectivity is the construction of a road that links the 
port to Pakistan’s highway system. Pakistan’s national highway system also requires upgrades and 
expansion to connect it to Chinese road networks in Xinjiang, and to the wider Central Asian region. 
At present, there are only two roads connecting Gwadar to Pakistan’s road network: the Makran 
Coastal Highway (N-10) that runs east toward Karachi and west to the Iranian border, and the 
incomplete M-8 highway, which runs north-east toward Sindh and Punjab. Neither provides 
sufficient land transport capacity or range to support a thriving gateway port at Gwadar. 
 
Figure 4. Official CPEC roadways map145 
At present, the only thoroughfare connecting the port to other roads is a 16-foot wide local road lined 
by restaurants, mosques, and food stalls.146 This is not a viable route for trucks serving the port. After 
 
144 Drazen Jorgic, “Fearing Debt trap, Pakistan Rethinks Chinese ‘Silk Road’ Projects,” Reuters, September 30, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-silkroad-railway-insight/fearing-debt-trap-pakistan-rethinks-chinese-silk-road-
projects-idUSKCN1MA028. 
145 CPEC Authority, “Monographic Study on Transport Planning, 2013-2030,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 
http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/1 (accessed August 1, 2020). 
146 CPEC Authority, “Gwadar East-Bay Expressway,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/project-
details/32 (accessed May 4, 2020). 
26 
 
land reclamation and construction along Gwadar’s east bay (currently underway), this route will be 
replaced by a 6-lane expressway. The planned “East-Bay Expressway” is intended to connect the port 
area to the M-8 highway and N-10 arteries that connect Gwadar to the rest of the country. The CCCC 
broke ground on this project in November 2017,147 and landfill on the east side of the peninsula can 
be seen on satellite imagery. The project has been repeatedly paused, however, and may be forced to 
reroute due to protests by local fishermen whose livelihoods will be upset by the highway cutting off 
access to their fishing pier.148 Completion of an expressway that will circumvent that route is now 
projected for October 2020.  
Gwadar is thus in the process of being connected to Pakistan’s highway system. However, for 
Pakistan’s highways to provide a “corridor” connecting the port to western China, substantial road 
works are required elsewhere in the country. In particular, the linchpin of the China-Pakistan 
overland connection is the Karakorum Highway (KKH) in the northeast of the country. It long 
predates CPEC and is sometimes referred to as the “China-Pakistan Friendship Highway,” because it 
was jointly constructed and is the only road link between the two countries. Construction began in 
1959, and Chinese engineers and workers were instrumental throughout the 27 years it took to build 
this “Eighth Wonder of the World,” so dubbed because it traverses some of the most treacherous 
terrain on the planet (and reportedly cost the lives of 800 workers).149  
The KKH runs 1,300 km, from Hasan Abdal in Punjab province and passes through Gilgit-Baltistan 
before traversing the highest mountain pass in the world (the Khunjerab Pass, over 4,500 meters 
elevation) and terminating in Xinjiang. It is another 420 km along China National Highway 314 to 
the first Chinese city, Kashgar. The mountainous sections of the route are only passable several 
months a year, depending on conditions, and major landslides, avalanches, and earthquakes often 
render it impassable even during the warm season.150 Since an MOU was signed between the two 
governments in 2008, Chinese firms funded by China Export-Import Bank loans have been working 
to expand the road from 10 to 30m in width to triple its transport capacity.151 But natural disasters 
have limited progress to date. A landslide in the Hunza Valley in January 2010 created a massive 
lake covering more than 20km of the road. After several years of trying to repair the road, the CBRC 
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opted to reroute it in 2012 and completed a new road and series of tunnels circumnavigating the lake 
in September 2015.152 Plans to re-establish the original route have been permanently shelved.153 
Elements of the KKH have been upgraded, with a spur from Thakot to Havelian in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province “substantially completed” by CCCC in March 2020. Another spur running 
136 km from Thakot to Raikot in Gilgit Baltistan is still undergoing a “feasibility study for 
realignment,” reflecting both engineering and bureaucratic challenges facing this high mountain 
route.154 Pakistani planners claim they are searching for “financially viable road projects and schemes 
in less developed areas,” including “the western route of CPEC [to Balochistan and Gwadar],” but 
allocation of funding still skews towards the more developed east of the country.155 
Despite slow progress in road construction, China’s third largest truck manufacturer, state-owned 
China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. (Sinotruk), signed a strategic cooperation 
framework agreement with COPHC and Gwadar’s port authority in August 2017.156 Heavy trucking 
industries will be critical to ongoing construction and transport, particularly in the absence of railway 
links to the port at Gwadar.  
Railroad Networks 
Gwadar is not yet connected to Pakistan’s rail networks. Technical studies on Gwadar’s viability as a 
port hinge on successful development of links to inland railroads, which are concentrated in the east 
of the country.157 China, which has laid more domestic high-speed rail line than any other nation in 
history, has a direct interest in improved rail systems,158 since the continental portion of its Belt and 
Road Initiative hinges on extensive rail connectivity throughout Eurasia.159 The rail network in 
Xinjiang is comparatively well-developed and could easily facilitate access to the wider Chinese 
market once rail connectivity to the port of Gwadar is completed.160  
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Figure 5. CPEC official railway plan161 
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However, Pakistan’s existing railroad network requires substantial investment since it lacks the 
capacity to meet current commercial demand.162 As is the case for most other infrastructure, 
Balochistan is worse off than the rest of the country.163 Nonetheless, Gwadar’s rail connectivity has 
not yet been a priority for Chinese and Pakistani planners. Current CPEC plans prioritize 
improvements to Pakistan’s existing rail network—including at Port Qasim—and postpone plans for 
new rail lines to connect Gwadar to the “middle and long term.”164 Pakistani Railway Ministry 
officials evidently do not view the costs of connecting Gwadar as worth the expected benefits—
especially not weighed against other priorities.165  
For some Pakistani transport analysts, if the goal is to link Gwadar to Central Asian and Chinese 
markets, then the port is more likely to be integrated into Iranian rail network to the west.166 The 
relative efficiency of the Iranian rail system provides one argument for continuing to delay any major 
investment in rail in Balochistan.167 Sanctions on Iran have made this option unattractive, but this 
disincentive is not necessarily permanent. As China and Iran explore a more substantial bilateral 
relationship, the prospect of circumventing western Pakistan to access Central Asia through Iran may 
prove more appealing.168 India’s existing port project at Chabahar and fraying Sino-Indian ties, 
however, will make Chinese inroads into Iran’s transport networks more challenging.169  
 
162 Dr. Muhammad Asim and Imtiaz Qanita, “International Review of Management and Business Research Pakistan 
Railways at the Verge of Collapse: A Case Study.” International Review of Management and Business Research, vol. 3, 
(September 2014), pp. 2306-9007; Sohail Rahsid, “55% of Pakistan’s Rail Tracks Are More Than 100 Years Old,” Samaa, 
March 19, 2019, https://www.samaa.tv/news/2019/03/55-of-pakistans-rail-tracks-are-more-than-a-100-years-old-report/; 
The official CPEC site calls for “capacity development” and has established “focus groups…for capacity enhancement.” 
CPEC Authority, “Progress Update,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/progress-update (accessed 
August 1, 2019). 
163 Planning & Development Department, Government of Balochistan, “Infrastructure Development in Balochistan,” 
World Bank Public Sector Development Programme, 2003-2004, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/Pakistan-Development-Forum-
2004/RDPBalochistan.pdf; Fahad Naveed, “Train to Balochistan,” Pakistani Dawn, October 8, 2016, 
https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153377. 
164 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Annual Plan 2019-2020,” p. 156. 
165 Chief Executive of Pakistan Railways, Aftab Akbar, testified to a Senate Sub Committee on Railways that Gwadar rail 
links (to Mastung and Besima to Jacobadad) are not planned until 2025, largely because the cost is prohibitive. Amin 
Yusufzai, “Rail Connectivity of Gwadar With Other Parts of Pakistan Not a Priority: Officials,” Propakistani, April 6, 
2019, https://propakistani.pk/2019/04/06/rail-connectivity-of-gwadar-with-other-parts-of-pakistan-not-a-priority-officials/. 
166 “Iran ‘Ready to connect Gwadar to Chabahar Port,’” The Express Tribune, May 24, 2019, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1979802/3-iran-ready-connect-gwadar-chabahar-port/; “Iran After Connecting Chabahar to 
Pakistan’s Gwadar,” Fars News Agency, May 24, 2019, https://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13980303000457. 
167 There have been discussions by Chinese and Indian sources about linking Gwadar to Chabahar, the nearby Iranian port 
developed by India. 伊朗查巴哈尔港比中国援建的巴基斯坦瓜达尔港更具发展优势 [“Iran’s Chabahar Port is More 
Advantageous Than the Chinese-built Gwadar Port in Pakistan”], 驻巴基斯坦使馆经商处 [Economic and Commercial 
Office of the PRC Embassy in Pakistan], March 24, 2008, 
http://pk.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200803/20080305443938.html; Sudha Ramachandran, “India Doubles Down on 
Chabahar Gambit,” The Diplomat, January 14, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/india-doubles-down-on-chabahar-
gambit/. 
168 Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership,” New York 
Times, July 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html; Shahram 
Akbarzadeh and Mahmoud Pargoo, “Iran-China deal raises more questions than answers,” Middle East Institute, July 27, 
2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-china-deal-raises-more-questions-answers.  
169 There has been Indian interest in the commercial port at Chabahar since roughly 2003. In 2016 the countries agreed to 
upgrade the port and into rail lines connecting Chabahar to Iran and Central Asia. In 2020, in the wake of the announced 
“China-Iran deal,” the status of the Indian project at Chabahar wsd called into doubt. See Maya Mirchandani, “On 
Chabahar, India Must Recover Lost Ground With Iran Quickly,” NDTV, July 18, 2020. 
30 
 
Some Chinese scholars believe that if Pakistan could connect directly into China’s advanced logistics 
networks it could readily “turn Gwadar into China’s exit to the sea.”170 These and other hopeful 
suggestions neglect to consider the engineering and security challenges posed by building rail lines 
across mountainous and insecure terrain of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan.171 A China-
Pakistan joint railroad group met in summer 2017 to develop these plans, but no progress is visible. 
At present there is little realistic prospect of laying down rail connecting China and Pakistan.172 
Remarkably, a former senior diplomat at the PRC Embassy in Islamabad pointed out that “a China-
Pakistan railway must always lose money” because of the relative cheapness of maritime shipping 
and the prohibitive expense of building and maintaining rail infrastructure.173 
Air Transport 
Gwadar’s viability as an international transport and trading hub requires air transport. Beginning in 
2019, Chinese firms began constructing a “New Gwadar International Airport” to replace the small 
facility currently serving Gwadar. This new project is managed by China Airport Construction 
Group, directly subordinate to the Civil Aviation Administration of China, a branch of the PRC 
Ministry of Transport. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co., Ltd. and China Railway Beijing 
Engineering Group Co., Ltd. are contracted to construct the airport. 174  
Although the Chinese government converted the original $230 million loan to a grant in 2015,175 it 
took four years before construction began at a site 26 km east of Gwadar out in the desert in an area 
known as Goran Dani.176 A groundbreaking ceremony was held in March 2019 with Pakistan’s 
President Imran Khan in attendance.177 It is designed to be Pakistan’s second largest airport covering 
18 square kilometers (6.9 square miles) with a runway more than 12,000 feet (3,658 meters) long—
capable of handling the largest civilian and military aircraft.178  
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Image 4. Chinese staff working on the New Gwadar International Airport179 
Security and virus containment measures are recent challenges for the airport construction site that 
reveal aspects of its development. In May 2020, the head of the Chinese project management group 
visited the site in a convoy of military and police vehicles. He said the site resembled a military 
facility due to the large presence of military personnel, bunkers, concrete roadblocks, sandbags for 
blast proofing, and watch towers. No medical facilities capable of handling the spread of COVID-19 
exist. The virus situation has also slowed shipments of construction supplies from Karachi from 
weekly to monthly. That the supplies come from Karachi strongly confirms that the nearby port of 
Gwadar remains ill-suited to meet even local needs.180   
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Once the new airport is operational it will provide a ready connection to China without the manifold 
challenges posed by ground transportation. The PRC central government intends to develop 
Xinjiang’s aviation sector and its role as a hub for Central and South Asia.181 Chinese analysts 
promote an “Aviation Silk Road” and claim that “by building up and expanding airports and aviation 
operations in Pakistan’s major cities and along its coast, China can open up an air corridor to the 
Indian Ocean.”182 Air transport may augment the commercialization of the port, but its low capacity 
and high cost make aviation an unlikely commercial savior.183 It could, however, enable military 
logistics that would have otherwise been impossible. 
Oil and Gas Infrastructure 
For nearly 15 years, China and Pakistan have made announcements of ambitious plans for oil and gas 
infrastructure development at Gwadar as detailed below, but to date no oil or gas terminals, 
refineries, or pipelines have been built.  
• In 2006 Hu Jintao visited with a delegation that signed an MOU for a $12.5 billion Chinese 
petrochemical terminal at Gwadar.184 
• In 2015, China Pipeline Petroleum Bureau (a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum 
Corporation, one of the three major Chinese national oil companies) agreed to build a 42-inch 
diameter pipeline with two compressor stations to handle some 500 million cubic feet per day 
from the planned terminal at Gwadar.185 The projected cost of $1.6 billion of both pipeline 
and LNG terminal would bring the line as far as Nawabshah to connect with other Pakistani 
pipelines; an additional spur to Lahore is planned for another $2 billion.186 These projects 
have not yet been approved by Pakistan’s Ministry of Petroleum and Resources.187 
• In 2018, a planned LNG terminal on the north side of the bay was originally due to be 
completed, but work on the project was delayed when Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning sought 
to lease an FSRU rather than purchasing one outright, as a cost saving measure.188 
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• In 2019, CNPC reportedly considered building an 80km spur connecting Gwadar to the 
Iranian border, but persistent sanctions on Iran have prevented development.189 
In early 2019, Saudi Arabia stepped in to offer financing and construction for oil facilities near 
Gwadar that may displace the long-stalled Chinese project.190 After a trip to Pakistan by Saudi crown 
prince Mohammad Bin Salman, the Saudis pledged $10 billion to build a petrochemical refinery 
complex in the north bay at Gwadar.191 Chinese firms initially appeared concerned about this Saudi 
interest.192 Increasingly, they express cautious optimism about possible Sino-Saudi cooperation to 
help Pakistan’s troubled fiscal situation.193 Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE have pledged financing 
to keep Pakistan on track in servicing its current IMF bailout loan, providing some evidence of 
coordinated Chinese and Saudi support for their struggling partner.194 More recent reports, however, 
deal another blow to hopes of developing Gwadar. The Saudis announced they may move the 
location of their refinery from Gwadar, where there are no other oil and gas facilities, to Hub, a city 
near Karachi.195 
Chinese analysts may be coming to terms with the commercial futility of developing Gwadar into a 
petrochemical processing hub. The urgency to do so may be diminished, as oil and gas are now piped 
from Kyaukphyu, Myanmar to Yunnan province in southwestern China, providing one direct link to 
the Indian Ocean (and the subject of a forthcoming case study in this series). Further, the feasibility 
and desirability of a Pakistan energy corridor is in doubt. A researcher from the PRC Ministry of 
Commerce recently disparaged the so-called “Malacca Dilemma” as a “pseudo-concept,” in part due 
to varied needs China would face if there was actually a concerted effort to interdict China’s 
maritime energy shipments. Wartime oil demand could be curtailed, and reserves and existing 
overland routes could be tapped in the short term.196 In peacetime, the cost of constructing pipelines 
and refineries compared to building and operating crude oil carriers makes the maritime route 
significantly cheaper and higher capacity, even given the greater distance.197 This research report 
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estimated that the overland transport costs would be 42 percent of the selling price of the oil, 
compared to less than 2.5 percent of the price of oil transported by sea.198 While some Chinese 
academics unaccountably predict that some 60% of China’s energy needs could be supplied via 
pipeline from the Indian Ocean,199 Chinese officials do not consider this remotely realistic.200  
Technical analyses of the viability of overland pipelines to supply Chinese energy demand make note 
of the capacity limitations inherent in pipelines. Pipelines have a maximum throughput that cannot be 
scaled up like seaborne transport. Logistics experts at Dalian Maritime University have analyzed the 
cost and reliability of the overall logistical chain, modeling a series of scenarios predicated on 
different assumptions about risks to different maritime and land channels. They find that the highest 
utilization scenario for Gwadar would provide only six percent of China’s oil imports.201 These 
analysts also note the many other seaborne passages for oil and gas, including from the Americas, 
Africa, and the Arctic, that could further mitigate the “dilemma” and obviate the need for costly, 
risky overland routes.202 Other analysts assess the overland security risks (e,g., from terrorism and 
natural disasters) are both more acute and more likely than those affecting the maritime route.203  
Power Priorities  
The slow pace of linking Gwadar with transport infrastructure is partly a result of those projects 
being crowded out by a higher Pakistani priority: power. The majority of the projects listed formally 
as “CPEC” concern power generation, mostly in the form of coal fired power plants.204 Power 
shortages are the norm in Pakistan, especially in Gwadar, where severe outages—as long as 20 hours 
per day—are not unusual. Since 1999, all of Gwadar’s electricity has been imported from Iran.205 
There is great demand for stable power that must be met before any more ambitious development can 
be carried out. 
Power generation is thus among the key Chinese projects around Gwadar. The CCCC began 
constructing a $542 million 300mW coal-fired power plant 40 km east of Gwadar on November 4, 
2019. Ning Jizhe, the deputy director of China’s lead economic planning group, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, attended the groundbreaking ceremony to emphasize China’s 
leadership’s focus on projects in line with Pakistani demands.206 Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and 
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Infrastructure took a long time approving the project in part because the local Baloch government 
claimed that 14mW is sufficient for local purposes and the resources would be better spent 
elsewhere. The Balochistan Environmental Protection Agency also took several years to authorize 
the plant’s construction.207 Despite these delays, Dongfang Electric Corporation reportedly won the 
bid to supply two 150mW steam turbine generators for this project in late March 2020.208 With this 
large-scale equipment on the way, Gwadar may have ample electricity in the near future.209 
Overall Assessment of Transport Infrastructure 
While Chinese officials and scholars routinely discuss the prospective transport corridor as though it 
were operational, very little modern infrastructure has been built beyond a few roads and the port 
itself. This is not atypical of Chinese investment abroad, which is marked by leadership summits with 
memorandums of understanding signed, repeated announcements of the same projects, followed by 
halting progress.210 Chinese engineers familiar with the project acknowledge “at present, the 
hinterland of the port is limited to the neighboring areas.” 211 The lack of high capacity transport 
infrastructure greatly limits the potential for Gwadar’s commercial development. The Balochistan 
hinterland is insufficient to realize the grand regional ambitions for Gwadar. However, the long-term 
nature of China’s interest in Pakistan’s development cautions against ruling out the eventual 
development of a viable transport network. Such connectivity is vital to both of Beijing’s central 
aims, to create an “exit to the sea” and to develop Pakistan—and through that development, to 
promote security and stability in China’s western provinces and near abroad.  
Inland Markets & Resources 
The resources and markets of Pakistan (and of its neighbors) provide China with linked economic 
and security incentives to remain invested in the Gwadar project. The CPEC program, of which 
Gwadar is a key instrumentality, is the main vehicle for Chinese commercial activity in Pakistan. To 
date, however, that “flagship” initiative has largely focused on power projects without developing the 
transport infrastructure that would enable Gwadar to drive broad-based economic development. This 
section briefly summarizes the markets and resources that the port and its transport infrastructure 
may unlock, exploring Chinese projects inland as well as more recent efforts to trade with landlocked 
Afghanistan.  
Pakistan’s Limited Commercial Appeal  
The Chinese aim to develop Gwadar and its hinterland transport network targets some significant 
economic opportunities. Pakistan’s 233 million people make it the world’s fifth most populous 
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nation.212 This vast human potential is one of the reasons for China’s largesse in Pakistan, and 
informs the business case for investment in power and transport infrastructure. PRC Ministry of 
Commerce analysts believe that with “early harvest” projects for power generation and transmission 
intact, China can help Pakistan to “build a complete industrial sector through international capacity 
cooperation and the construction of overseas economic and trade cooperation zones.”213 That is, 
China will export its goods and industrial capacity to Pakistani markets once the country has 
sufficient infrastructure. This is a heroic aim, and despite the enthusiasm of Chinese promoters, is 
privately not considered a high-probability outcome by more sober-minded analysts.214 
Pakistan is beset by major problems hindering economic progress. Although its GDP grew at an 
annual rate of roughly 5 percent for the period 2013-2018,215 Pakistan suffers from chronic 
macroeconomic instability. In mid-2019, Pakistan received its thirteenth IMF bailout in the last thirty 
years, 216 this one a $6 billion loan to deal with a persistent balance of payments crisis.217 China’s 
CPEC investment evidently has not improved Pakistan’s macroeconomic health.218 Although 
Pakistan is the target of growing Chinese investment, Sino-Pakistani bilateral trade remains “tiny and 
weak,”219 actually contracting from 2017 to 2018.220   
Poor past performance notwithstanding, Pakistan’s young demography and low levels of 
urbanization present some attractive growth opportunities.221 In light of China’s growing labor costs 
and export tariff burdens to key markets, Pakistan is also attractive as an investment destination 
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because of its low tariffs into the American market.222 Chinese trade specialists meanwhile 
emphasize the “significant trade complementarities” between imports of Pakistan’s minerals and 
agriculture, and exports of China’s consumer goods and technology products.223  
Inland Industrial Parks  
The CPEC program intends to help Pakistan move up the value chain from commodity exports into 
light manufacturing and industry. This development would potentially facilitate “industrial transfer” 
from China to Pakistan and creating consumers for Chinese exports.224 During a meeting of the 
China-Pakistan Joint Cooperation Committee in December 2016, nine special economic zones were 
proposed, each to be established with China’s financial and managerial assistance. These zones 
require stable power, water, labor, and administration, and therefore depend upon the success of 
“early harvest” projects.225 Many in Pakistan are advocating for a an even larger-scale effort in 
industrialization with the creation of 46 special economic zones.226  
None of these zones are yet operational, but the official CPEC website currently lists the nine zones 
in various stages of planning and development.227 One more mature example with a Chinese investor 
and operator is the Rashakai Economic Zone. It is the result of an MOU signed between the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa provincial government and China National Electric Engineering Company in January 
2017.228 This zone is meant to eventually cover 1,000 acres and is meant to feature industrial clusters 
in garment and textile products, home building materials, general merchandise, electronics and 
appliances, automobiles and mechanical equipment.229 It is reportedly the first zone to begin 
attracting Chinese business, offering customs relief, ten years of income tax exemption, permission 
for full foreign ownership of assets, and other incentives tailored to Chinese investors.230 There are 
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also special economic zones or industrial parks spanning a variety of industries planned at sites in 
Bostan, Islamabad, Faisalabad, the Port Qasim area and elsewhere.231       
Balochistan’s Resources 
 
Image 4: Map of Major Mineral Distribution in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.232 
 
Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest and poorest province. Its substantial mineral resources present a 
tempting commercial opportunity, but political instability and significant security risks have kept 
most investors at bay. Chinese firms, however, have invested in Balochistan’s mineral resources 
since the 1990s. Chinese analysts note that geologic surveys reveal that Pakistan is not as poorly 
endowed with minerals as was once believed, and that there is a great potential for further 
development.233 Chinese analysts identify some 40 minerals as abundant in Balochistan.234 Metals 
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(especially copper and gold) and natural gas are found largely in Balochistan, while other minerals 
like coal are concentrated in central Pakistan.235 Balochistan is the source of nearly 80 percent of 
Pakistan’s oil and gas reserves, by some estimates.236 The largest gas field in Pakistan, at Sui in 
eastern Balochistan, is past its peak but still active and being developed by Pakistani firms.237  
Metallurgical Construction Corporation of China (中国冶金建设集团公司) was one of the earliest 
Chinese developers of Pakistan’s mining industry, building the Saindak copper and gold mine in the 
1990s, near Pakistan’s border with Iran and Afghanistan. It gained the rights to operate this mine in 
late 2001, and has exported copper and other minerals to China. Further to the east, the firm also 
established the Duddar lead and zinc mine in November 2008, operated jointly by three Chinese 
firms. Both of these projects in Balochistan are tax-exempt.238  
However promising the mineral wealth, thus far it has not been successfully exploited and marketed. 
Even optimistic Chinese observers concede that a host of issues—security prominently among 
them—continue to frustrate Balochistan’s potential.239 The “lack of physical, institutional, and 
regulatory infrastructure” in Balochistan means that agriculture, livestock, and fisheries remain the 
principal industries in the province.240 Chinese efforts to develop a Gwadar fishing industry may be 
mostly an attempt to mollify worsening sentiments among the local population.241 Gwadar Free Zone 
Company is pushing for “relevant enterprises” to outfit Gwadar fishermen with upgraded ocean-
going fishing vessels and training in their operation on a “partial donation” basis.242 Displaced local 
fishermen will be “absorbed” into fish processing and other activities related to their own occupation 
once the factories are set up.243  
Chinese analysts further lament that “low-grade transportation channels” have so far limited the 
exploitation of Balochistan’s mineral wealth.244 Chinese engineers with experience at the port believe 
that the effort to connect the port to markets and resources further afield is unlikely to succeed in the 
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near term because of long and costly effort required to build transportation infrastructure. 245 Thus 
they conclude that industrialization on site at the port and its immediate surroundings is the optimal 
development goal, with potential for “petrochemicals, automobile assembly, and construction 
material processing…and as conditions mature, gradually expanding to shipbuilding, equipment 
manufacturing, and other heavy industries.” The commercial case for developing Gwadar as a means 
for accessing Pakistan’s markets and resources, then, is not a powerful one—even among Chinese 
advocates.   
Other Markets and Resources Beyond Pakistan 
Gwadar figures prominently as “the exit to the sea for the five Central Asian countries.”246 Among 
these, Afghanistan has been the Central Asian state of most interest. Pakistan has been part of the 
regional trade and transport organization, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 
since 2010 (and China is a founding member). Industry analysts believe that “Pakistani seaports 
(Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar) are becoming promising gateways for CA [Central Asia], 
including the XUAR [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region], because most cities in CA are closer to 
the Pakistani seaports than the ports in Russia, China, Iran, Georgia and the Baltic countries.”247 
Gwadar will require extensive development of transport infrastructure to facilitate trade to 
landlocked Central Asian states, but this potential broader market is part of its appeal. 
Afghanistan is the first, and most proximate, landlocked Central Asian state to see trade from 
Gwadar port. In January 2020, Gwadar was officially opened for use under the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA).248 This overland transit to landlocked Afghanistan used the N-65 
road from Gwadar, one of a small handful of completed CPEC transport infrastructure projects in the 
area (see Image 7 below). The first shipment of chemical fertilizer was delivered by a COSCO ship 
in January 2020, then trucked up to the border at Chaman in northern Balochistan,249 with subsequent 
shipments continuing in May.250 Pakistani officials have been looking to shift NATO cargoes to 
Afghanistan from Karachi to Gwadar since at least 2018,251 and Chinese-built infrastructure appears 
to be making this a possibility. However, such limited commercial activity at Gwadar port is 
demonstrative rather than profit-driven. It enabled officials to highlight the use of local labor and 
once again to hold out hope for expansion beyond fertilizers into other bulk cargoes like sugar and 
wheat. But at present the enterprise remains quite small in scale.252  
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In aggregate, the markets and resources of Pakistan and its Central Asian neighbors are potentially 
significant but unlikely to be accessed via Gwadar at scale without much more substantial 
investment. Analysts differ on the magnitude of the commercial opportunity and the probability that 
the transport networks will make it possible. However, in surveying the Chinese discourse on the 
economic purposes of Gwadar port and the broader CPEC endeavor, the most consistent themes are 
concerns about security, both internal and external. While PRC reporting on Gwadar and CPEC 
dutifully hypes the business case for the projects, nearly all Chinese analysis calls attention to the 
abundant risks that attend any development in Pakistan. Chinese officials, businesspeople, and 
analysts are actively debating whether Pakistan’s various “non-economic problems” can be overcome 
by Chinese capital and expertise.253 Those problems—especially terrorism and political instability—
are even more acute in Balochistan, which must be developed if Gwadar is to thrive.  
 
Figure 6. Six Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridors254  
 
253 Tang Mengsheng, “One Belt One Road’s Flagship and Benchmark” 
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The Xinjiang Connection 
Chinese interest in Pakistan’s economic development becomes more comprehensible when 
considered as part of China’s “holistic” outlook on internal and external security policy. Though 
Gwadar is distant from the PRC border, it is the essential node linking China’s western regions to the 
Indian Ocean. It is therefore vital to the realization of Beijing’s second strategic objective identified 
in the introduction to this case study—namely, to secure its periphery and stabilize Xinjiang. 
The ambitious PRC development projects underway across Pakistan are recognizable as extensions 
of long-standing social and economic development policies in its far-flung western regions, Xinjiang 
in particular. Xinjiang is officially designated a “core area” of the BRI because it sits at the heart of 
Central Asia’s regional transport networks.255 It is also Beijing’s central concern in two decades of 
policy programs to develop the less prosperous western regions of China. Chinese security officials 
and analysts believe that terrorism and unrest in Xinjiang is a consequence of its connections to 
people, ideas, and resources beyond its borders, especially in Pakistan. China’s continuing efforts to 
promote Pakistan’s development thus reflect this first order security priority more so than the highly 
uncertain prospects of realizing the touted commercial goals for Gwadar and CPEC. This section first 
examines the security threats facing by Chinese businesses operating at Gwadar and Balochistan, 
then explores the connections drawn between terrorism and development in Chinese thinking about 
its relationship with Pakistan. 
Security Risks in Pakistan 
The commercial prospects for the Chinese projects at Gwadar are uncertain in significant part 
because of the local security situation.256 Terrorism in particular poses a direct threat to Chinese 
workers and projects, which have been targeted by Baloch nationalist groups hostile to China’s 
presence.257 This risk has not, however, deterred Chinese investment in Pakistan—in fact, perhaps 
counterintuitively, it may have spurred increased investment since bringing about a more secure and 
stable Pakistan through development is the underlying strategic motivation.  
The willingness to invest despite known security costs in Balochistan is not necessarily out of step 
with Chinese risk acceptance across the Belt and Road portfolio. Indeed, Chinese outbound 
investment concentrates in countries and regions with relatively high levels of security, political, and 
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economic risk.258 China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), the leading Chinese 
state-owned insurance firm, rated overall risk for investing in Pakistan at a 7 out 9 (with 9 as the 
highest risk), and judged terrorism in the South Asian region overall makes it “one of the most risky 
in the world.”259 Nonetheless, China’s officially pledged $62 billion investment in CPEC is the 
highest such figure among BRI countries since 2013, and Pakistan has been China’s third largest 
target for outbound FDI and construction.260  
To manage these risks, Chinese people working across the country are protected by dedicated 
security personnel. Pakistan provide a “Special Security Detachment” (SSD) headquartered in 
Karachi and Rawalpindi of between 15,000 and 17,000 armed personnel detailed specifically to 
protect Chinese nationals and projects.261 Between 3,000 and 5,000 of these have been detailed to 
Gwadar262 and the rest to the developed eastern part of the country.263 Chinese analysts have also 
urged Chinese firms to hire private security contractors.264 Typically, Chinese personnel and firms 
are protected by a mix of military, paramilitary, police, and private security contractors and secure 
housing and work areas.265 Most of the security contractors are Pakistani, but the Chinese private 
security firm Dewei Security Service Group was reportedly hired to implement security measures at 
Gwadar port.266 Enhanced security is evidently required at Gwadar and along the Makran coastal 
highway. Visits to Gwadar must be preapproved by the Pakistan Government and military, and 
danger along the coastal highway has led Pakistani authorities to prohibit Chinese from taking the 
road from Karachi to Gwadar, requiring them to fly instead,267 and as recently as January 2020, the 
 
258 One study by scholars from the Chinese Academy of Sciences analyzes 74 Belt and Road countries and finds “an 
‘investment paradox’ in some [BRI] countries, namely, a large amount of investment and a high level of risk” 刘海猛 [Liu 
Haimeng], et al., “一带一路”沿线国家政治-经济-社会风险 综合评估及防控 [“A Comprehensive Assessment Of 
Political, Economic, And Social Risks And Their Prevention For The Countries Along The Belt And Road”],” 地理研究 
[Geographic Research], no. 38 (March 2019), pp. 15-16. 
259 中信保国别风险研究中心 [Sinosure Country Risk Research Center], 一带一路 65个国家风险状况分析 [“Analysis 
of the Risk Status of 65 Countries Along The Belt And Road”], 中国海洋发展研究中心 [China Oceans Academy 
Research Center], October 12, 2018, http://aoc.ouc.edu.cn/3f/1c/c9824a212764/pagem.psp.  
260 At $46.2 billion, Pakistan trails only Australia ($58.89b), the UK ($70.76b), and the US ($142.56b). See “China Global 
Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/, accessed June 
20, 2020. 
261 Renmin/Caijing Report, p. 22.  
262 A Pakistani analyst cites 5,700 personnel of the paramilitary Frontier Corps. Maham Hameed, “The politics of the 
China―Pakistan economic corridor.” Palgrave Communications, vol. 4, no. 64 (2018), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0115-7.pdf, p. 7. A Chinese analyst cited a Pakistani army officer who 
claimed 3,000 army personnel were deployed to Gwadar port alone. See 濠州 [Hao Zhou], 中巴经济走廊的卡西姆难题 
[“CPEC’s Qasim Problem”], 财经杂志 [Caijing Magazine], April 6, 2017, https://finance.sina.cn/2017-04-06/detail-
ifyecfnu7476475.d.html?from=wap. 
263 For example, a special detail is assigned to the Chinese power project and coal berth at Port Qasim. 彭光桥, 张文斌 
[Peng Guangqiao and Zhang Wenbin], 中巴经济走廊特别安保部队新长官到卡西姆项目视察 [“New Security Chief of 
CPEC Special Security Detachment Inspects Qasim Project”], 卡西姆港发电有限公司 [Qasim Port Power Generation 
Co. (Subsidiary of Power China Corp)], http://pr.powerchina.cn/g163/s927/t7799.aspx. 
264 张新平, 张立国 [Zhang Xinping and Zhang Liguo], 中巴经济走廊”建设中的俾路支问题 [“The Baloch Question and 
the Construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 和平与发展 [Peace and Development], no. 5 (2018), p. 48. 
265 金华 [Jin Hua], 巴基斯坦恐怖袭击威胁分析与防范策略探讨 [“Pakistan terrorist attack threat analysis and 
discussion of prevention strategy”], 中国安防 [China Security and Defense], no. 12 (2018), pp. 35-40. 
266 用科技护航海外利益，中国安保勇迈 ‘高风险区’ [“Use Technology to Escort Overseas Interests, Chinese Security 
Moves Forward into ‘High-risk Areas’”], 凤凰国际智库 [Phoenix International Think Tank], June 28, 2017, 
https://pit.ifeng.com/a/20170628/51334082_0.shtml. 
267 “Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan Build an Airport, I Took Part in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project.”  
44 
 
PRC Ministry of Foreign affairs renewed a standing warning for Chinese citizens not to go to 
Balochistan at all.268 
Security measures may mitigate the risks, but they do not make Pakistan—Balochistan in 
particular—a safe place for commerce. A geospatial analysis of terror attacks in Pakistan by 
researchers at China’s People’s Public Security University found the spread of terror attacks in 
Balochistan to be worsening over time.269 The PRC government reportedly offered to dedicate an 
additional 1 percent of each project to support security costs.270 The port’s free trade zone has better 
security than the city itself,271 but even this “green zone” is not immune from terrorist attacks. In 
May 2019, Baloch gunmen stormed the only upscale hotel in Gwadar where Chinese business 
travelers stay, killing five Pakistanis.272 The Balochistan Liberation Army’s video statement 
following the attack was unequivocal: “BLA [forces] will attack Chinese officials and installations in 
Balochistan…. The CPEC will fail miserably on the Baloch land. Balochistan will be a graveyard for 
your expansionist motives.”273 
Perceived Transnational Terrorist Threat to China 
Chinese security analysts are fixated by the potential for Pakistan-based terrorism and social 
instability to spill over into China. The “Chinese War on Terror” concentrates on Pakistan because its 
loosely governed border regions appear to be a major vector for radicalization and training of 
Chinese Muslims.274 Pakistan’s security forces have been long-time collaborators with China in its 
efforts to eradicate a succession of purported Uyghur terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, beginning as early as the 1990s.275 Domestically, Beijing’s perception of an increased 
threat of terrorism has led to a dramatic intensification of its already harsh policies of repression of 
Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.276  
The transnational element of the perceived terrorist threat—whether accurate or not—evidently 
provides powerful impetus to Beijing to pursue aggressive policies in Xinjiang and the countries 
bordering it.277 Leading Chinese security officials, like Qin Tian, deputy commander of the 
 
268再次提醒中国公民近期暂勿前往巴基斯坦俾路支省 [“Additional Reminder to Chinese Citizens Not to Travel to 
Balochistan in the Near Future”], PRC Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, January 13, 2020, 
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lsyj/t1731374.shtml. 
269 Cheng Canyang and Chen Wenjing, “Analysis of Pakistan Terrorist Attacks Based on Spatial Statistics,” p. 25. 
270 Renmin/Caijing Report, p. 23. 
271 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” 
272 Asad Hashim, “Gunmen Attack Hotel in Pakistan’s Gwadar, Kill Five People,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/gunmen-attack-hotel-pakistan-port-city-gwadar-190511134034253.html. 
273 Shahzad Hussain (@SHussainShokat). 2019. Twitter, May 19, 2019,5:53 p.m. 
https://twitter.com/SHussainShokat/status/1130230043991523328. 
274 See Small, “The China Pakistan Axis,” pp. 67-91 for a study of China’s “war on terror” from the 1990s onward, 
including extensive PRC collaboration with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. 
275 刘双瑜, 吴绍忠 [Liu Shuangyu and Wu Shaozhong], 浅析中国与巴基斯坦开展反恐合作的缘由及实现路径 
[“Reasons and Achieving Paths of China’s Cooperation with Pakistan on Anti-Terrorism”], 贵州警官职业学院学报 
[Journal of Guizhou Police Officer Vocational College], no. 6 (2016), pp. 101-106; see also Small, “The China Pakistan 
Axis,” pp. 67-91, and Small, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in China.” 
276 For an extensive review of these policies, see Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart 
Attitude’: China’s Political Re-Education Campaign In Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 1 (2019), pp. 102-
128. 
277 For a nuanced analysis of this phenomenon as it bears on Chinese policy in Xinjiang, see Greitens et al., 
“Counterterrorism and Domestic Repression.” For further discussion of the actual incidences of transnational terrorism 
involving Chinese citizens, see Mathieu Duchatel, “China’s Foreign Fighters Problem,” War on the Rocks, January 25, 
2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/chinas-foreign-fighters-problem/ and Small, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in 
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paramilitary People’s Armed Police, are focused on the Uyghur linkages with terrorist groups and 
other “hostile forces” abroad: 
In light of the terrorist incidents that occurred in Xinjiang and the way many carried out 
planning and command overseas for attacks within our borders, a pattern of collusion has 
formed. The terror incidents occurring along the frontier border regions are based out of 
transnational terrorist organizations and backed by hostile forces. Foreign terrorist 
organizations mainly support [China’s] domestic terrorist organizations in terms of 
organization, public opinion, funding, technology, and strategy.278  
Terrorist activity in Pakistan and the instability in Xinjiang are therefore intrinsically linked in the 
minds of China’s leaders. Xi Jinping’s “holistic security outlook” (总理国家安全观) prescribes 
coordination between “the two security situations at home and abroad” and thus carries on a long 
tradition in Chinese strategic thought linking internal and external security.279 Applying this 
“holistic” approach, Chinese analysts call attention to domestic and international causes and 
consequences of the perceived terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Purported terrorist cells in China “use 
West Asia as a base camp, Central Asia as a bridgehead, South Asia as a training base, Europe and 
the United States as their coordination and command center, and China as the main battlefield.”280 
Internal security, in this line of thinking, requires management of external threats. The preferred 
mode of managing those threats is through economic development. 
The notion that economic development is the “cure” for the “disease” of terrorism is one corollary of 
Xi’s prescribed security outlook.281 The view that “economic security is the foundation of holistic 
national security” 282 leads China to pursue policies of economic development precisely to manage 
Pakistan’s unfavorable security situation. A leading Chinese diplomat and former PRC Ambassador 
to Pakistan dismissed the American post-9/11 military approach to counterterrorism as “treating 
symptoms but not curing the disease” and prescribing instead “gradual implementation of the 
projects of CPEC so that economic and social conditions of the backward areas of both Pakistan and 
 
China.” While there is an increasing incidence of Uyghur fighters overseas, the number and severity of terrorist attacks in 
China remains quite low. This does not, however, mitigate Beijing’s belief in a Uyghur threat and aggressive measures to 
stifle it with “preemptive repression.” See Greitens et al., “Counterterrorism and Domestic Repression,” pp. 37-44. 
278 Qin Tian, “The Anti-Terrorism Situation,” p. 52 
279 See, for example, Chusei Suzeki, “China’s Relations with Inner Asia: The Hsiung-Nu, Tibet,” David M. Farquhar, 
“The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” and Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368-1884,” in John 
King Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968). 
280 王宏伟 [Wang Hongwei], 国家安全治理的内外整合：以打击’东突’恐怖主义位列 [“Integration of Domestic and 
International Factors in National Security Governance: A Case Study of China’s Combat Against East Turkistan Terrorist 
Forces”], 国际安全研究 [International Security Research], no. 3 (2019), p. 88. 
281 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 习近平关于总体国家安全观论述摘编 [“Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Discussion on the Holistic 
National Security Outlook”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 26, 2018, 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0426/c1003-29952393.html. This medicalization of terrorism extends to Pakistan as 
well. According to two Chinese scholars, “Balochi terrorism is like a cancer that hinders the development of Pakistan. If it 
is allowed to grow and develop, it is tantamount to “cultivating a tumor. See  Li Jiacheng and Jiang Hongyi, “Examining 
the Pakistani Political Obstacles to the Construction of Gwadar Port,” p. 136. 
282 Xi emphasized this point in the first meeting of the Central National Security Committee in April 2014. 习近平 [Xi 
Jinping], 坚持总体国家安全观 走中国特色国家安全道路 [“Adhere to the Holistic National Security Outlook and Take 




China will be improved, and the hotbed of terrorism—poverty—will be gradually reduced.”283 
Economic development is often the primary prescription for how to treat the real and imagined 
ailments of the Chinese body politic. 
Pakistan’s Role in China’s “Develop the West” Campaign 
Pakistan is vital to Chinese ambitions to cure the “disease” of terrorism with economic development. 
Beijing’s vision to develop and thereby stabilize its far western provinces, especially Xinjiang, 
explicitly involves efforts like Gwadar and CPEC. Chinese economic attention to Pakistan should be 
understood as part of the gradual development of China’s campaign to develop its western regions, 
which have badly lagged the coastal, eastern parts of the country. The desire to develop and stabilize 
China’s western provinces explains much of China’s sustained economic program in Pakistan. The 
widely publicized Silk Road Economic Belt (i.e., the land “belt” in the Belt and Road) is in many 
respects the extension of these domestic stability and development policies. The “Great Western 
Development” (西部大开发) or “Go West” (西进) strategy, initiated in 1999, is the domestic 
precursor to BRI, and the programs are now intertwined.284  
The objective of a stable, prosperous Xinjiang lies at the heart of both programs. China’s leaders 
explicitly link Gwadar’s development and the CPEC program to these efforts. When Li Keqiang 
announced CPEC in 2013, he stated that China and Pakistan “agreed to establish an interface 
between China’s strategy to develop its western region and Pakistan’s domestic economic 
development.”285 The former PRC Ambassador to Pakistan, Zhou Gang, explained the impetus for 
this linkage: 
Pakistan’s security is China’s security…. Pakistan has critical significance for safeguarding 
peace and tranquility in China’s Xinjiang Region, steadily advancing the Great Western 
Development strategy and the development of friendly relations with Central Asia, South 
Asia, and the Gulf countries.”286   
The tight coupling of security and development in Xinjiang and Pakistan is plain across official and 
scholarly commentary on CPEC.287 Official guidance reinforced this linkage in a May 2020 “Guiding 
 
283 Lu Shulin, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Flagship and Exemplary Project of the Belt and Road,” p. 56. 
284 Then-president Jiang Zemin proposed the program in June 1999, which was unveiled during the Fourth Plenary Session 
of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and marked for its implementation during the Central 
Economic Work Conference later that year. See 共和国的足迹——1999年：西部大开发 [“The Footprints of the 
Republic—1999: Great Western Development”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government Portal], October 10, 2009, 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-10/10/content_1435029.htm. For discussion of the internal-external policy connections, see 
董志敏 [Dong Zhimin], “一带一路”与“西进”战略的关系 [“The relationship between ‘One Belt One Road’ and ‘Go 
West’ Strategies”], 边疆经济与文化 [The Border Economy and Culture], no. 2 (2016), pp. 24-25. 
285 中国和巴基斯坦关于深化两国战略合作的联合声明 [“China and Pakistan Joint Statement on Deepening Bilateral 
Strategic Cooperation”], 新华 [Xinhua], May 24, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-05/24/content_2410193.htm. 
286 张蔚然 [Zhang Weiran], 李克强将访巴基斯坦 “四好”关系续新篇 [“Li Keqiang to Visit Pakistan, Continuing the 
‘Four Goods’ Relationship”], 中国新闻 [China News], May 15, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/05-
15/4821007.shtml. 
287 Lu Shulin, another former Ambassador to Pakistan and later think tank expert and author, provides a clear example: 
“For China, the significance of building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is also very obvious. After more than 30 
years of reform and opening up, the economy in eastern my country has developed rapidly, and the western region has also 
improved significantly, but it is still relatively behind the eastern coastal regions. Now China is vigorously advancing the 
‘Great Western Development’ strategy in order to achieve balanced development of the east and the west and achieve 
long-term stability of the country.” Lu Shulin, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Flagship and Exemplary Project of 
the Belt and Road,” p. 51. 
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Opinion on Promoting Development of the Western Regions in the New Era,” which exhorted 
officials to “coordinate the two major issues of development and security, and make better use of the 
national security barrier in the western region.”288 That recent authoritative statement also referred to 
Xinjiang as a “core region” of the BRI and urged cadres to “accelerate” the “west-facing 
transportation hub and trade logistics center.”289 Rebranded in this Guiding Opinion as “Go West,” 
China’s domestic western development plans dovetail with their foreign BRI program, with a nexus 
in Xinjiang. 
China’s domestic priorities further designate Xinjiang a conduit for energy from abroad that bolsters 
growth (and promotes security) in western provinces. As one group of scholars put it, “to push 
forward China’s Great Western Development strategy we need an ‘exit to the Indian Ocean.”290 This 
demand for Xinjiang’s Indian Ocean connectivity was captured in policies such as the 2007 PRC 
State Council’s determination that Xinjiang should be an “energy import corridor” to the west.291 
This long-held ambition has yet to produce a pipeline through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.292   
In summary, the inland markets and resources of Pakistan and neighboring countries present some 
theoretically attractive commercial prospects, but these have not borne fruit largely because of the 
high costs associated with instability and security risks. In PRC public discourse, despite scattered 
dissent,293 the most commonly expressed view is that Pakistan’s development is instead a matter of 
PRC “border security.” In the words of two academic analysts, PRC goals in Pakistan are to secure 
“stability and prosperity in Pakistan through the participation of Xinjiang, such that China’s anti-
terrorist barrier and security outpost can maintain its stability on the western frontier, ensuring long-
term security in Xinjiang.”294 Beyond securing China’s troubled border areas, however, the prospect 
for naval utilization of the port remains a tantalizing possibility. 
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09/03/content_2744853.htm. 
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Issues Take Priority in China”], 中国选举与治理 [China Elections and Governance], June 18, 2017, 
http://www.chinaelections.org/article/141/245978.html. 
294 Lei Ming, et al. “Current Situation and Recommendations for Pakistan Economic Cooperation,” p. 49. This belief in 
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Naval & Military Component 
Reports of Gwadar’s use as a Chinese naval or military facility are premature.295 The port’s location, 
its low commercial utilization, and the close bilateral political-military relationship make it a 
perennial favorite for analysts predicting China’s next overseas military base. Yet there have been no 
PLA deployments to Gwadar to date, nor even a single observed PLAN port call. The reasons for this 
lack of military utilization may outweigh those recommending it. This section first considers the 
physical capacity of Gwadar to support PLAN operations, then analyzes its military utilization to 
date, and assesses future possibilities for the facility. 
Suitability for Hosting PLAN Vessels 
From the standpoint of physical capacity, Gwadar could readily be repurposed for use as a PLA 
military facility. If no commercial traffic is permitted, the draught (12.5m) and quay wall (602m) 
dimensions mean Gwadar’s port facilities could support the PLAN’s largest vessels, such as the 
Type-075 amphibious assault ship (LOA 235m, draft 7-8m), Type 071 landing platform dock (LOA 
210m, draft 7m), and the Type-901 fleet replenishment ship (LOA 241m, draft 10.8m).296 PLAN 
aircraft carriers could also call on Gwadar, though conditions such as tidal variation, wind, and 
atmospheric pressure could push depth at the port below PLAN under-keel clearance limitations.297 
Any major surface combatant (Type 055 cruisers, Type 052D destroyers, Type 054A frigates) could 
berth simultaneously with the carrier. Periodic dredging can manage Gwadar’s siltation issue and 
make the port navigable for all PLAN vessels under most conditions.  
 
environment. Radical thoughts and social movements from outside will be transmitted back to Xinjiang. The good 
situation in Pakistan will play a positive role in promoting long-term security in Xinjiang. China's policies in Xinjiang also 
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Beyond the pier, Gwadar possesses a sizeable laydown yard for marshalling military equipment and 
materials. If the free zone adjacent to the terminal fails to attract business, the vacant warehouses, 
administrative buildings, and living quarters could be provided for military use. While the PLA could 
likely deliver reliable power to such a facility and thus the ships at quay, it may not be necessary if 
Dongfang Electric Corporation’s turbine generators are installed in the expected Gwadar Coal Power 
Plant. Additionally, bunkering services, water supply, ship chandlery, medical services, and crew 
arrangements are among the services reportedly provided by Gwadar Marine Services Limited, a 
COPHC subsidiary.298 Especially given low levels of commercial utilization, Gwadar could provide a 
number of regular services to naval ships operating in theater without much economic disruption to 
the terminal.  
Potential Value as a Military Base 
Despite sufficient capacity, the PLA has not made use of Gwadar to date. No officials have 
commented on why this is the case, nor have Chinese analysts speculated about why the facility has 
not been utilized by the navy. However, there are several circumstances under which the PLA might 
request and receive access to facilities at Gwadar. These are worth considering in operational terms, 
even if they are politically uncertain. 
PLAN vessels could stage from Gwadar to operate in and around the Persian Gulf, or to assist in 
convoying commercial vessels across the Indian Ocean during times of crisis or conflict. Security 
issues and the lack of connectivity with the rest of Pakistan are major obstacles in the commercial 
development of Gwadar, but these conditions make for a more secure location from a military 
perspective.299 With no significant commercial activity or international presence in Gwadar, PLA 
activities could be concealed from foreign observers. Gwadar’s port and airport sites are tightly 
guarded compounds, walled off from outsiders and manned with the help of Pakistan forces.300    
China’s primary SLOC and first overseas military base in Djibouti are far-flung for the PLAN, and 
not supported directly by any other Chinese military facilities. Stronger logistical support in the 
northern Indian Ocean would be useful. Running through the South China Sea and across the Indian 
Ocean, it takes ten or more days for PLAN task forces to reach the Gulfs of Aden or Oman.301 PLAN 
forces are tasked with diverse overseas missions, from humanitarian/disaster relief efforts to the 
projection of power to secure overseas interests and citizens.302 However the geographic distances 
involved present major problems for equipping and supplying PLAN ships for all contingencies, 
especially in urgent situations. Ships will not likely be carrying everything they need when a crisis 
arises.  
 
298 “Gwadar Marine Services Limited,” COPHC Website, http://cophcgwadar.com/gmsl.aspx, (accessed May 24, 2020). 
299 The case can be made that such isolation and insecurity also make supplying a navy base there more difficult. However, 
if all that is required is basic parts support, fuels and lubricants, and husbanding services, the resident infrastructure is 
more than sufficient. If the port is to be used for more complex wartime operations, however, its poor connectivity will 
limit how well personnel and heavy equipment can be transported overland. Air and sea transport direct to Gwadar are not 
limited by poor road and rail connection, so the facility could well be adequately supplied for some period of time. 
300 For a project manager’s impression of security at work sites in Gwadar, see “Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan 
Build an Airport, I Took Part in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project.”  
301 The 1st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force reportedly took ten days and nights to travel from Sanya, Hainan to the Gulf of 
Aden. Other points of departure, weather conditions, and technical issues could prolong the journey. 中国海军舰艇编队
抵达任务区正式开始护航 [“Chinese Naval Task Force Arrives in Mission Area and Formally Begins Escorts”], 中广网 
[China National Radio], January 6, 2009, 
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302 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy. 
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Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other materials at Gwadar would be a productive use of the 
facilities. Such measures would complement other supply points around the region and mitigate the 
political risks that one or more might be unavailable at a given time. It would also allow task forces 
to optimize their loadouts for more immediate mission requirements. Even a low-footprint 
warehousing agreement in Gwadar would provide significant benefit to PLAN forces. Two PLA 
Army logistics experts recently recommended flexible overseas prepositioning methods, including 
rental or construction agreements with overseas commercial ports and airports to embed such support 
amongst commercial operations.303 Additionally, general-use goods could be stored in Gwadar’s 
warehouses, freeing up more secure locations such as the underground facilities of the Djibouti 
Support Base to store munitions, parts, and other high-end materials.304 Furthermore, Chinese naval 
vessels need not go to Gwadar themselves to retrieve stored materials. Merchant vessels contracted 
as part of the strategic projection support shipping fleets could provide regular service for the PLAN 
to reduce any negative responses from international observers.305 COPHC or any other PRC logistics 
provider would be competent in managing prepositioned inventories in Gwadar port’s newly 
constructed warehouses. While there is no evidence as yet to demonstrate that the PLAN intends to 
use Gwadar as a logistics hub, the possibility bears careful observation. Additionally, COPHC would 
be legally bound to render support to PLA overseas operations according to article 38 of the PRC’s 
National Defense Transportation Law.306  
Similarly, the PLA could make use of Gwadar’s new international airport. The construction of the 
East Bay Expressway will provide an improved link between the port terminal and the airport. The 
length of the new airport under construction at Gwadar (12,000 feet) and secure housing and medical 
facilities on site could accommodate any PLA aircraft. The airfield is within the maximum range of 
the Y-20 PLA strategic transport aircraft flying from the Chengdu-Qionglai airbase in western 
China.307 It could thus provide a site for these aircraft to land, refuel, and rest their crews, and to 
deliver parts, personnel, and combat and support vehicles.  
 
303 Authors are from the PLA Army Logistics University. 刘俊, 段志云 [Liu Jun and Duan Zhiyun], 境外行动中的军事
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Conor M. Kennedy, “Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection,” CMSI China Maritime Report No. 4 (December 2019), 
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discussion by PLAN officers of the applicability of the National Defense Transportation Law to overseas port calls, see 高
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307 Chad Peltier, “China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations,” Jane’s, April 15, 2020, 
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Further, the airfield could allow inflow of Chinese military forces to the region. Indeed, the head of 
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Transport and Delivery Bureau noted in 2017 the improving conditions 
of overseas ground support from overseas agents and Chinese enterprises. He recommended greater 
use of their services to support aircraft overseas through bidding and contractual agreements.308 
Another officer in his bureau sees the construction of airports along the Belt and Road as a great 
opportunity to strengthen China’s overseas aviation projection capabilities.309 The PLA lacks fixed-
wing support capabilities at its support base in Djibouti, increasing the possibility that Gwadar may 
someday be used for China’s growing strategic lift fleet of Y-20s.310  
Indeed, for these reasons many PLA analysts consider Gwadar to be a suitable site for military 
support. Several PLA authors noted in 2015 that under COPHC’s lease the port could “absolutely” 
become a long-term rest and replenishment point for PLAN escort task forces.311 Other PLA experts 
find Gwadar to be an obvious choice for establishing an overseas strategic strongpoint, owing to its 
geographic location, military importance, and Chinese port operator.312 Some state outright that the 
PLA is exploring the construction of a support base in Gwadar.313 Other Chinese military observers 
believe PLA access to Gwadar is as good as established. One PLA officer said of the PLAN’s option 
for using Gwadar as a base, “The food is already on the plate; we’ll eat it whenever we want to.”314  
Pakistan Navy Utilization of Gwadar 
Capacity for berthing warships and meeting logistics requirements only establishes conditions of 
possibility. It tells us very little about how the facility is likely to be employed. One Pakistani Navy 
(PN) officer hopes “China would also deploy its naval ships in coordination with Pakistan Navy to 
safeguard the port and trade under the CPEC.”315 This raises the possibility of a combined facility 
used by both militaries. The actual PN utilization gives us some sense of the current naval and 
military utility of Gwadar and indicates areas where such cooperation might occur. 
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In the absence of commercial activity, Gwadar port’s operations appear to be dominated by the 
PN.316 The PN prizes Gwadar port because its distance from the Indian border provides a degree of 
strategic depth that Karachi does not enjoy.317 Gwadar is home to the small Pakistan Naval Station 
Akram, established in 1987 as a depot for naval detachments.318 PNS Akram occupies a large amount 
of land on the peninsula’s cliffs, with only a small pier on the far east end of the Gwadar peninsula. It 
also serves as a surveillance station, part of Pakistan’s network for monitoring the North Arabian 
Sea.319 Further, a 500-man 3rd Marine Battalion was commissioned in March 2013 and is stationed in 
Gwadar to provide security for the port and its operations.320 
While Gwadar port is a commercial venture, a 2016 Pakistan Senate briefing by deputy chief of naval 
staff for operations reports that the facility offers the PN “substantial operational flexibility.” 
According to the report, the PN has been given 600 meters of berthing space at the port and the 
establishment of a naval base at Gwadar is “high on priority.”321 This means the entirety of the 
Gwadar terminal’s current frontage is available for the use by the PN.  
Accordingly, Pakistan’s naval forces are making extensive use of the facility. PN Task Force-88 was 
established in December 2016 to secure the sea lanes and maritime areas around Gwadar. It 
comprises ships, fast-attack craft, aircraft, drones, and other surveillance assets.322 From February 
2019 through April 2020, Pakistan Navy vessels called at the port every month an average of three 
times.323 In a third of these port calls, at least one of the 2,500 ton, Chinese-built F-22P “Zulfiqar” 
frigates was among the vessels at the pier.324 These vessels are export versions of the PLAN’s Type-
 
316 There appears to be some precedence for this. A 2006 World Bank report noted “the dominance of the Navy in port 
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053H3 frigate, which Chinese defense experts consider essential to Pakistan’s ability to operate in the 
Indian Ocean in light of India’s superior naval forces.325 
The PN has also increased land acquisitions and augmented its presence in the Gwadar district, 
indicating greater Pakistan military entrenchment in Balochistan.326 Some suggest this expansion into 
Balochistan is part of Pakistan’s Regional Maritime Security Patrol initiative, meant to enhance 
maritime security in the Arabian Sea and wider Indian Ocean region and boost Pakistan’s role in 
securing the critical sea lanes in its neighborhood. 327  
The need for Chinese technical expertise to operate and service the PN will likely increase. In 
addition to the four F-22P frigates delivered between 2009 and 2013, the PN entered into a contract 
with China Shipbuilding Trading Company Ltd. in 2018 to deliver four Type-054A frigates by 2021. 
Ships developed with Chinese technical assistance account for the bulk of the PN’s surface fleet and 
the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency’s vessels.328 Technicians from China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation are often present in Karachi to provide assistance, and regular flights between Karachi 
and Gwadar mean these experts could be on site with little notice.329 Chinese technical expertise is 
already important to the PN, but will grow even more so after delivery of the eight contracted S-20 
conventional submarines (export variant of the Yuan-class). An agreement reached in 2015 stipulates 
delivery of four hulls built in China between mid-2022 and 2023 with the remaining four to be 
constructed at the Karachi shipyard by 2028.330  
Because China and Pakistan maintain close technical connections, it is possible PLAN ships may 
make technical stops at Gwadar to receive parts and take advantage of resident Chinese technical 
expertise.331 COPHC is legally obligated to provide for the supply and rest of PLA forces, and 
controls all operations and services at the port.332 There is also some scope for the PLA to exercise or 
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patrol with the PN in maritime security operations in and around the Gulf, as well as to share 
intelligence and surveillance data collected from the station at PNS Akram. However, the absence of 
PLAN at Gwadar despite these opportunities is an important (but not permanent) observation. 
The Preferred Karachi Alternative 
To date, the PLAN has preferred the established well-developed facilities of the port of Karachi. 
Chinese naval vessels visiting Pakistan have so far exclusively made port and replenishment calls 
there, and with some regularity (see Appendix).333 The commercial port at Karachi can satisfy PLAN 
replenishment requirements and serve among several of other preferred resupply locations that 
enable PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean.334 China’s 2nd Anti-Piracy Escort Task Force (ETF) 
conducted a friendly visit to Karachi in August 2009.335 Other ETFs have visited Karachi in the years 
since (see Appendix), although Oman, Djibouti, and Saudi Arabia are the sites of more frequent port 
calls for PLAN rest and replenishment.336  
The PLAN typically visits Karachi for diplomacy and joint exercises. It consistently participates in 
the Pakistan-hosted “Aman” series of multilateral exercises, which feature participating ships and 
observers from numerous nations.337 More recently, the Southern Theater Command Navy sent four 
ships to the China-Pakistan nine-day bilateral exercise “Sea Guardians-2020,” held for the first time 
in Karachi.338 Sea-based exercises in the northern Arabian Sea included formation maneuver, joint 
patrol, air-defense, maritime interdiction, joint anti-submarine warfare, live-fire drills, and joint 
marine corps training. The PLAN provided overall direction for the exercise, taking the lead in 
efforts to improve organization and command and control for combined missions.339 Such exercises 
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demonstrate a substantial degree of cooperation between the PLAN and PN, providing some 
confidence that Gwadar might also be used by the PLAN, alone or in combination with the PN.  
 
Image 5: Liugongdao submarine tender and Weishanhu replenishment ship at Karachi during “Sea Guardians-2020” exercise 
Karachi’s proximity to India make it less desirable to some Chinese analysts.340 However, the PLAN 
continues to make extensive use of it even with a functioning port at Gwadar. China State 
Shipbuilding Corporation personnel in Karachi have provided unspecified “equipment repair 
services” to PLAN escort forces in port.341 Other reports also find that PLAN submarines conduct 
stops in Karachi, with at least one occurring in May 2015, although specific submarine port calls are 
difficult to confirm through open sources. PLAN submarine activities in the region cause significant 
consternation in India.342 Such sensitivities may impose significant restraints on building reliable 
overseas logistics support for PLAN submarines, although Pakistan could conceivably do so.343 This 
broader question would require political decisions in Beijing and Islamabad, and consideration not 
only of Indian sensibilities, but those of extra-regional powers like the United States.  
Because Pakistan is such a close security partner with China, and so dependent on Chinese good will 
for its economic and military development, it is not far-fetched to expect that Pakistan would 
welcome more substantial PLA use of the facility under some conditions. Still, the most critical 
factor limiting the basing option at Gwadar (or Karachi, Jiwani, or elsewhere in Pakistan) is the 
apparent lack of political commitment between China and Pakistan to provide mutual military 
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support during times of crisis or conflict. More likely in the short- to medium-term is a fuller 
realization of the dual-use potential of the facility. If the transport infrastructure projects mature, 
Gwadar could become a key peace time replenishment or transfer point for PLA equipment and 
personnel.344 But establishment of a base from which the PLAN could undertake naval operations 
throughout the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean during periods of conflict is unlikely. Ultimately, 
the militarization of China’s Gwadar port facility requires a strategic decision in both Beijing and 
Islamabad that will not come without significant trade-offs. 
Conclusion 
Gwadar will not inevitably become a PLAN base. The strategic strongpoint concept, however, 
recommends serious consideration of the site’s potential military utility for China. That is, Gwadar 
will continue as a commercial facility operated by a state-owned Chinese firm that can make 
arrangements for military use: guaranteed pier space, fuel and supplies, and perhaps even munitions 
and some level of technical support for the PLAN fleet and personnel. In this model, China’s aims to 
put its best foot forward—namely, the huge scale of trade, investment, finance, and construction that 
its government and state-owned enterprises can deliver in concert. This substantial economic 
footprint is meant to develop and secure Pakistan for China’s benefit. By leading with commercial 
presence, China aims to create permissive conditions for political decisions that could support 
military utilization of the port and its surrounding infrastructure. 
Such arrangements are uniquely suited to Pakistan, which is reasonably considered a most-likely 
candidate for China’s next military base. Pakistan is after all distinguished by its long-standing 
strategic alignment with China, growing dependence on Chinese trade and investment, extraordinary 
reliance on Chinese weapons sales, and close military and intelligence cooperation with the PLA.345 
However, Pakistan is not a Chinese ally. China has never intervened on Pakistan’s behalf in its serial 
conflicts with India, and evidently prefers to provide Pakistan with only sufficient capability and 
diplomatic cover to take care of its own affairs.346 Thus, mutual political commitment between the 
two countries that would allow for PLA basing in times of conflict cannot be assumed. 
Managing China’s relationship with India (however strained it is at present) is a high priority for 
Beijing—arguably higher than any other in the region, including Pakistan. Chinese leaders will not 
sacrifice that crucial bilateral relationship for the sake of a single military facility, and will carefully 
consider first- and second-order effects that would certainly result from a more overtly militarized 
PRC posture in Pakistan. As a former counsellor to the PRC Embassy in Pakistan put it, “if China 
builds a military base in Gwadar, no matter whether or not it signs a treaty, it will essentially form an 
alliance with it…this runs counter to our South Asia policy for the last 30 years.”347 It would indeed 
be an extraordinary change to China’s diplomacy in the region to decide that it prefers marginal 
improvement in its naval posture in the region to a stable relationship with India. 
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Drawing primarily on the official and academic discourse in China, this case study has focused on 
how Chinese experts understand the value of investing in a strategic strongpoint at Gwadar. We 
identify two distinct but converging objectives, one largely internal, the other external. The first, 
internal objective is arguably the most urgent and proximate explanation for China’s largesse in 
Pakistan. That is, Beijing hopes to stabilize Xinjiang province by providing security and development 
in neighboring Pakistan. Gwadar is an anchor for this ambitious development program for Pakistan, 
CPEC. PRC officials and analysts view peripheral security as fundamental to internal stability, 
drawing on a “holistic national security concept” with deep provenance in Chinese thinking on 
managing its frontiers. Nominally economic programs like the “Great Western Development” (and 
its rebranding as “Go West”), the “Belt and Road Initiative,” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road” all manifest this internal-external orientation, and require that both Xinjiang and its peripheral 
areas remain stable, secure conduits for China’s relations with the rest of the Eurasian continent. 
The second objective, largely external, is to ensure reliable access to the Persian Gulf to support 
energy flows and a strategic presence in the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean region. Gwadar 
has major geographic appeal as an “exit to the ocean” because Pakistan is contiguous to western 
China and can, in theory, provide a secure logistical corridor to the sea. Only Myanmar and India 
likewise share borders with China as well as the Indian Ocean. The key limitations on realization of 
this objective are the insecurity, instability, and underdevelopment of Gwadar and Balochistan.  
China’s efforts to build transport infrastructure are proceeding, albeit at a glacial pace. Road, rail, and 
pipeline connections require political stability and a level of security that has proved unattainable in 
Pakistan. This situation should not be expected to change quickly, if at all. While the untapped inland 
markets and resources of Pakistan and Central Asia may provide some real incentive for 
consolidating these transport links, the COVID-19 pandemic, continued Pakistani macroeconomic 
instability, and China’s domestic economic slowdown combine to recommend a healthy dose of 
skepticism that these lofty economic purposes will be achieved. 
Despite these challenges, Gwadar need not be a major commercial hub to help anchor China’s 
military, political, and economic presence in the Indian Ocean region. Its potency as a geopolitical 
instrument, however, comes with significant opportunity costs. Pakistan’s neighbor and rival, India, 
is hostile to China’s expanding presence in the region. Especially with the existing strains on the 
Sino-Indian relationship due to their border disputes, a “second front” is sure to drive India to more 
aggressive balancing against Chinese power in the Indian Ocean region. The more India feels 
threatened by Chinese presence in the region, the more attractive the United States becomes as a 
security partner for historically unaligned India. Beijing may not believe that India is likely to join an 
alliance with Western nations, but the rapid decay of that major bilateral relationship would greatly 
complicate China’s overall posture in the Indian Ocean region.  
These wider considerations hardly rule out the possibility of a more assertive and militarized Chinese 
presence at Gwadar. They do, however, establish hard trade-offs for Chinese strategists considering 
the net gains that Beijing would reap from a Gwadar military venture. If China-India and China-US 
relations continue to deteriorate rapidly, China may well determine that a confrontational posture is 
inevitable. In this case, overt militarization of China’s presence at Gwadar—perhaps in response to a 
terrorist incident or a threat in the Strait of Hormuz—might look appealing, even if it provoked harsh 
counter-measures. If, however, China is seeking to stabilize the precipitous decline in those 
geopolitical relationships, the internal and external security concerns analyzed here should win out. 
We would then expect to see China’s continued pursuit of Gwadar’s comprehensive development as 
a strategic strongpoint in the Indian Ocean.   
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Appendix. PLAN Port Calls to Karachi: 
Date Mission Vessels 
8 December 1985 Friendly visit Type-051 destroyer Hefei and Type-905 replenishment 
ship Fengcang  
November 1993 Friendly visit Type-679 training ship Zhenghe 
20 May 2001 Friendly visit Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin and Type-905 
replenishment ship Taicang 
21 November 2005 Friendly visit/joint exercise Type-051B destroyer Shenzhen and Type-903 
replenishment ship Weishanhu 
5 March 2007 Multilateral exercise “Aman-07” Type-053H3 frigates Lianyungang and Sanming 
21 February 2009 Multilateral exercise “Aman-09” Type-052B destroyer Guangzhou 
5 August 2009 2nd Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/friendly visit 
Type-054A frigate Huangshan and Type-903 
replenishment ship Weishanhu 
24 February 2011 8th Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-
2011” 
Type-054 frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan 
8 September 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/rest 
and resupply 
Type-054A frigate Yiyang  
15 September 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/ 
rest and resupply 
Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu 
22 September 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/rest 
and resupply 
Type-054A frigate Changzhou 
3 March 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-
2013” 
Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin, Type-053H3 frigate 
Mianyang, Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu  
29 July 2013 “Harmonious Mission-2013” Type-920 hospital ship Peace Ark 
27 September 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/friendly visit/joint exercises 
Type-052C destroyer Changchun and Type-054A 
frigate Changzhou 
22 May 2015 Rest and resupply Type-039B conventional attack submarine No. 335 
7 January 2016 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/friendly visit/joint exercises 
Type-908 replenishment ship Qinghaihu, Type-054A 
frigate Liuzhou, and Type-054A frigate Sanya 
15 November 2016 Joint exercises Type-054A frigate Handan 
14 February 2017 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-17” 
Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin, Type-054A frigate 
Handan, Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu 
10 June 2017 Task Force 150 friendly visit/joint 
exercises 
Type-052C destroyer Changchun, Type-054A frigate 
Jingzhou, and Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu 
30 November 2017 Joint exercise “Friend-2017” Type-054A frigate Jingzhou  
7 February 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-19” 
Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan and 
Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu  
4 January 2020 Bilateral exercise “Sea Guardians-
2020” 
Type-052D destroyer Yinchuan, Type-054A frigate 
Yuncheng, Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu, 
and Type-926 submarine support ship Liugongdao 
59 
 
Appendix Sources: 第一次军舰出访: 东海舰队访问南亚三国 [“First Warship Visits: East Sea Fleet Visits Three South 
Asian Countries”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 16, 2017, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2017-08/16/c_1121493381.htm; 郑和号训
练舰的六度出访 [“Six Visits by Zhenghe Training Ship”], 中国广播网 [China National Radio], October 30, 2009, 
http://mil.cnr.cn/zgjd/hj/200910/t20091030_505559772.html; 程昆仑, 邹强 [Cheng Kunlun and Zou Qiang], 一次难忘的
访问: 中国海军舰艇访巴侧记 [“An Unforgettable Visit: Report of Chinese Naval Ship Visit to Pakistan”], 光明日报 
[Guangming Daily], May 31, 2001, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/60/20010531/478820.html; 中国海军舰艇编队
抵达巴基斯坦开始友好访问 [“Chinese Navy Task Force Arrives in Pakistan to Begin Friendly Visit”], 中国政府门户网
站 [Chinese Government Portal], November 21, 2005, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2005-11/21/content_105417.htm; 中国海
军舰艇编队抵达巴基斯坦卡拉奇港 [“Chinese Navy Task Force Arrives in Pakistan Port of Karachi”], 人民网 [People’s 
Daily Online], March 7, 2007, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/43331/5447230.html; 海军驱逐舰赴巴参加 ‘和平-09’ 
海上多国联合军演 [“Navy Destroyer Goes to Pakistan to Take Part in the ‘Aman-09’ Multilateral Joint Maritime 
Military Exercises”], 中广网 [CNR], February 21, 2009, 
http://www.cnr.cn/military/zhongguo/200902/t20090221_505242823.html; 中国海军护航编队成功访问巴基斯坦 
[“Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Successfully Visits Pakistan”], 中华人民共和国驻卡拉奇总领事馆 [Consulate-
General of the People’s Republic of China in Karachi], August 9, 2009, http://karachi.china-
consulate.org/chn/zlghd/t577533.htm; 海军护航行动大事记: 中国海军护航行动大事记 [“Chronology of Naval Escort 
Operations: Chinese Navy Escort Operational Chronology”], 人民网-军事频道 [People’s Daily Online—Military 
Channel], December 16, 2011, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52965/16631515.html; 中国海军将参加 ‘和平-11’ 
联合军演 [“Chinese Navy To Participate in ‘Aman-11’ Joint Military Exercises”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], March 8, 2011, 
http://military.cntv.cn/20110308/105590.shtml; 中国海军护航编队首次停靠巴基斯坦卡拉奇港补给 [“Chinese Navy 
Escort Task Force Stops in Pakistan Port of Karachi to Replenish for the First Time”], 中国新闻网 [China News], 
September 9, 2012, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2012/09-09/4169451.shtml; 驻卡拉奇总领馆与中国海军第 12批护
航编队 “千岛湖” 舰官兵联欢 [“Consulate General in Karachi Celebrates with Personnel of the 12th Chinese Navy Escort 
Task Force Ship Qiandaohu”], 驻卡拉奇总领馆 [Consulate General in Karachi], September 19, 2012, 
http://karachi.china-consulate.org/chn/xwdt/t971147.htm; 中国海军第十二批护航编队 “常州舰” 顺利完成在卡拉奇补
给任务 [“12th Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Ship ‘Changzhou’ Successfully Completes Replenishment Mission in 
Karachi”], 驻卡拉奇总领馆 [Consulate General in Karachi], September 26, 2012, 
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t973738.shtml; 海军第十四批护航编队抵达巴基斯坦参加联合军演 [“14th Naval 
Escort Task Force Arrives in Pakistan to Take Part in Joint Military Exercises”], 中央政府门户网站 [Chinese 
Government Portal], March 3, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-03/03/content_2344045.htm; 中国海军第十四批护航
编队舰艇向外军官兵开放 [“14th Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Ship Open for Foreign Military Personnel”], 中国广播
网 [CNR], March 7, 2013, http://news.cri.cn/gb/27824/2013/03/07/6411s4042913.htm; 中国海军和平方舟医院船首访巴
基斯坦 [“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship Peace Ark’s First Visit to Pakistan”], 中国新闻网 [China News], July 29, 2013, 
http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/07-29/5097837.shtml; 中国海军第十七批护航编队访问巴基斯坦 [“Chinese Navy 
17th Escort Task Force Visits Pakistan”], 驻卡拉奇总领馆 [Consulate General in Karachi], September 27, 2014, 
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1195659.shtml; 印媒: 中国元级潜艇访巴基斯坦 印度海军警戒 [“Indian Media: 
Chinese Yuan-class Submarine Visits Pakistan, Indian Navy on Alert”], 人民网-环球时报 [People’s Daily Online—
Global Times], June 29, 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/big5/n/2015/0629/c172467-27225314.html; 中国海军第二十
一批护航编队访问卡拉奇 [“Chinese Navy 21st Escort Task Force in Friendly Visit to Karachi”], 驻卡拉奇总领馆 
[Consulate General in Karachi], January 12, 2016, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/zwbd_674895/t1331090.shtml; 曾行贱, 曹鹏 [Zeng Xingjian and Cao 
Peng], 中国海军第二十一批护航编队结束队巴基斯坦访问 [“21st Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Finishes Visit to 
Pakistan”], 中国海军网 [China Navy Online], January 12, 2016, http://navy.81.cn/content/2016-
01/12/content_6853217.htm; 中巴海军双边联合军演海上实兵演习阶段拉开战幕 [“Maritime Live-Troops Phase of 
China-Pakistan Bilateral Joint Naval Exercises Begins”], 中新网 [China News Service], November 20, 2016, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-11/20/c_1119949273.htm; 中国海军舰艇编队参加 ‘和平-17’ 多国海上联合演
习 [“Chinese Naval Task Force Takes Part in ‘Aman-17’ Multilateral Joint Maritime Exercise”], 中国新闻网 [China 
News], February 14, 2017, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/china/20170214/1687651.shtml; 王志鹏, 池铭, 林宝顺, 丁承成 
[Wang Zhipeng, Chi Ming, Lin Baoshun, and Ding Chengcheng], 中巴海军就 “朋友-2017” 联合军演筹划举行丰富交
流活动 [“China-Pakistan Navies in Plan and Hold Rich Exchanges During the ‘Friend-2017’ Joint Military Exercises”], 
国防部网 [Ministry of National Defense], December 2, 2017, http://www.mod.gov.cn/diplomacy/2017-
12/02/content_4798881.htm; 驻卡拉奇总领事王愚率领馆员欢迎海军第 31批护航编队到访 [“Consul General Wang 
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Yu Leads Consulate Personnel to Welcome the 31st Naval Escort Task Force Visit”], 驻卡拉奇总领馆 [Consulate General 
in Karachi], February 10, 2019, http://karachi.china-consulate.org/chn/xwdt/t1637339.htm; 薛成清, 顾亚根 [Xue 
Chengqing and Gu Yagen], 我海军参加‘和平-19’ 多国海上联合军演 [“Chinese Navy Takes Part in the ‘Aman-19’ 
Multilateral Joint Military Exercises”], 中国军网综合 [China Military Online Comprehensive], February 9, 2019, 
http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2019-02/09/content_9423502.htm; “海洋卫士-2020” 中巴海上联合演习开幕 [“China-
Pakistan Maritime Joint Exercise ‘Sea Guardians-2020’ Commences”], 海军新闻 [Navy News], January 6, 2020, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2020-01/06/c_1210427264.htm. 
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